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We asked for responses to the Green Pa per and we are certainly receiving a variety of them. As the articles in this 
issue demonstrate, the debate is lively: please do 
not hesitate to air your views. You have plenty of 
time since we have extended the deadline until 
the end of March. This is because the four 
committees in the European Parliament (Economic 
and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
Committee (lead), Legal Affairs and Citizens 
Rights, Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection and the Culture, Youth, Education 
and Media Committee) have only recently begun 
John Mogg to prepare their opinions on the text. It seems 
unlikely that they will have adopted their final positions before the end of 
January. The number of Parliamentary committees involved demonstrates 
the wide scope of the initiative and the political interest that it has attracted. 
One point of confusion that has appeared in early responses to the Green 
Paper concerns the issue of a notification system for new regulations 
impacting on Information Society services such as new on-line commercial 
communication services. The Green Paper explained the need for such a 
mechanism to prevent new barriers to the Internal Market and emphasised 
the need for a forward-looking commercial communications policy framework. 
Many of our early respondents have reacted positively to this suggestion. 
However, some have suggested that the Green Paper actually made this 
proposal. This is not correct. The proposed amendment to extend the scope 
of the existing notification system applying to regulations affecting the free 
circulation of goods for technical standards to cover new regulations 
impacting on Information Society services was adopted under separate cover 
by the Commission on the 30th August 19961. 
The new proposal carries four key messages: 
First, it defines Information Society services as all existing or new types 
of services that will be provided at a distance1 by electronic means and on 
the individualised request of a service receiver. 
This 'service ' definition would cover, for example: 
- on-line commercial communication services, 
- on-line professional services (solicitors' services, psychologists, 
stock-brokers, on-line health services, etc.) 
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- interactive entertainment services (video-on-demand, on-line video-
games, virtual visits to museums, etc.) 
- on-line information services (electronic library, on-line meteorological 
services , on-line financial information services, etc.) 
- virtual shopping malls, etc 
On the other hand, this definition would not cover (because they are 
either not offered at a distance, or not offered via electronic means, or not 
supplied on individual demand): 
- television broadcasting services (including near video on demand services) 
- radio broadcasting services 
- teletext 
- non-electronic direct marketing services (for example, mail order catalogues) 
- voice telephony services (including via GSM) 
Second, the proposal seeks to ensure that the Internal Market is 
preserved and that no new regulatory barriers appear. The proposed 
instrument will ensure that all draft rules directly affecting these services will 
be notified to the Commission and reviewed with the other Member States 
to ensure that they are compatible with the free movement of services and 
the country of origin control principle (i.e. the one stop regulatory shop 
whereby once a service offered in a Member State respects the laws of that 
Member State it can benefit from the legal certainty of circulating freely 
throughout the European Union irrespective of the laws of the other Member 
States). It should be noted that following the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, if a Member State fails to notify such a regulation, then such rules 
should not be applied. 
Third, the Commission has signalled its objective to make the European 
Union attractive to potential investors in new Information Society services 
by ensuring that the Internal Market regulatory framework will be effectively 
applied. 
Many service regulations in the United States are regulated at State level. 
This leads to significant fragmentation and legal uncertainty in that market. 
By ensuring that this well established framework is effectively applied it 
ensures that consumers are protected in the most efficient manner since the 
country of origin principle ensures the most effective redress against 
fraudulent or misleading Information Society services by ensuring that their 
complaints are dealt with by the regulatory authorities and Courts with the 
most effective power to sanction offenders i.e. the ones under whose 
jurisdiction the offending supplier falls. 
Fourth, through this proposal of an Internal Market driven approach to 
regulating the Information Society, the Commission demonstrates its wish 
to find an internationally agreed basis to regulate such new services. 
1 COM (96) 392 final; readers wishing to receive a copy should fax their 
details to DGXV E-5 on Brussels 2957712 or send an e-mail giving their full 
postal address to E5.@dg15.cec.be stipulating the language they would 
prefer. 
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Editorial 
S ince it was distributed, the most frequently asked question about the Green Paper on commercial communications to be put to this office has been about the composition and-functioning of the proposed 'review' committee. Whilst the de-
tail of this has yet to be determined, associated with this is another question which 
needs to be addressed by readers of this publication with some urgency. 
It seems clear that what we can refer to as the 'main' committee will need to draw 
on expert opinion from a wide range of interested parties. This process would be 
helped, and further benefits may well arise, with the establishment of what might be 
termed a 'shadow' committee. 
This 'shadow' committee could perform a number of important functions. It would 
obviously follow the progress of the 'main' committee closely and should be able to 
provide valuable guidance as to the priorities the committee should be setting. As al-
ready mentioned, it should also provide the 'main' committee with the opportunity to 
access expert opinion easily. There would also be a role to play in helping to shape 
the development of the electronic network proposed in the Green Paper and in devel-
oping the debate in the pages of this newsletter. 
If such an idea is accepted in principle, the question then is about how such a com-
mittee might be composed. In our view it will need to reflect the composition of the 
'main' committee as closely as possible. There would thus be fifteen standing mem-
bers and these could be complemented by a further fifteen offering specific expertise 
as the evolving agenda required. The 'shadow' committee will also need to reflect the 
range of interest groups involved in considering the regulation of commercial commu-
nications in the Internal Market. 
There would, of course, be a number of specialist committees communicating with 
any such 'shadow' committee. These would reflect the particular concerns of specific 
groups; consumer associations, sales promotion practitioners, broadcasters, advertis-
ing agencies and so forth. Many of these committees already exist and one could im-
agine that they too would be a useful source of expertise from which the two principal 
committees could draw. 
We would appreciate your views on this idea and suggestions as to how the 
'shadow' committee might be established. You may also have other ideas as to how 
the Commission's proposed committee could be supported. There seems little doubt 
that some sort of support structure would be a great help to the efficient operations of 
the process. 
If you have not already done so, please copy, complete and return this form to 
ensure you continue to receive your copy of Commercial Communications. You 
may also indicate whether you wish to receive the publication in French, Ger-
man or English. 
Name ..................................... .. ............... .. . Tel: .... ... ....... ... ....... ... ... ... .. ......................... . 
Company ............................................ ...... . Fax ............ .... .. ........ ... .. .. .... ....................... . 
Job Title ................................ .... ... ............. . e-mail. .......... ........................ .. ............. ..... .. 
Address ..................................................... . Language ................................ ..... ... .... .. ... . . 
Editorial 
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Sales promotion -
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boon or bane? 
W:ether sales promotion ('SP') is good thing or not seems to depend on where you live in the 
EU. In the UK it is a flourishing activity, 
and no restrictions (other than those of 
good taste, commonsense, and above all 
free-market discipline) apply. Discounting 
abounds, free sweepstakes accompany 
everything from fashion catalogues to 
magazine subscriptions, and incentives are 
even offered to acquire more incentives -
e.g. coupons that can be turned into 
Airmiles. It certainly makes for colourful 
shopping; Napoleon should have called 
the British a nation of shoppers rather than 
shopkeepers. 
Things are very different in Germany 
where most sales promotion devices are 
either 'verboten' or severely restricted. 
Discounts, the shopper's friend, are, for 
instance, limited to a paltry 3%. Premiums 
are allowed as long as their value is trivial, 
which is a bit like saying that you may 
abseil from any height provided the 
length of your rope does not exceed 3m. 
Neighbouring Austria has a different 
angle on the premium: never mind its size 
so long as you don't tell the customer 
how big it is. This is abseiling without any 
rope at all. But to make up for it, dis-
counts can be any size, without restric-
tion. 
Examination reveals that there is 
no consistency in the restrictions 
placed upon sales promotion prac-
tices in countries that might be ex-
pected to take a similar approach. 
It can therefore be concluded that 
no issue of principle is involved 
Let us look at another pair of Euro-
pean neighbours: Sweden bans sweep-
stakes but permits the use of premiums as 
an incentive to purchase; Norway does 
Victor Ross 
Former Chief Executive 
and European Regional Director 
Reader's Digest 
not, unless there is an affinity between 
the premium and the merchandise or 
service. But who is to decide how far the 
elastic band of affinity stretches? Free bi-
carbonate of soda with lunch for two 
would probably qualify, but would a 
voucher for dry-cleaning one's tie after a 
lobster dinner? 
If my list is light-hearted (i.e. eclectic 
but accurate), the argument is not. Exami-
nation reveals that there is no consistency 
in the restrictions placed upon sales pro-
motion practices in countries that might 
be expected to take a similar approach. It 
can therefore be concluded that no issue 
of principle is involved. Nor is there any 
consistency in the reasons given for re-
stricting SP. In some countries it is done 
to prevent 'unfair competition', i.e. to pro-
tect the seller; in others, where hostility to 
vigorous marketing needs less disguise, 
to protect the buyer. Both lines of reason-
ing are spurious and hark back to an eco-
nomic model that is outdated. 
A moment spent looking at what SP 
actually does will make this clear. Every 
SP device is a finger beckoning to a cus-
tomer: look at me, buy me, stay with 
me. Typically, it appears in the form of 
an incentive to take that last step to-
wards a buying decision - a discount, a 
gift, a prize, a little extra something to 
tip the scales. Living in a commercial 
environment, we are showered with in-
vitations to look, to sample, to act, to be 
loyal: from the cigarette cards of long 
ago to the Airmiles of today, from 
sweepstakes to British Telecom's dis-
counts for chatterboxes. SP activity is 
the last link in the chain of persuasion 
that begins with advertising and ends 
with the 'clincher' that confirms the de-
cision and makes the sale. 
This is how the supplier sees it. But 
what about the customer's perspective? 
To be effective, SP has to perform a serv-
ice the customer values. Which then are 
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the customer's needs that SP, in league 
with all the other mechanisms of the free 
market, seeks to satisfy? 
The consumer - and indeed every 
human being - is in constant pursuit of 
gratification. The nature of gratification is 
complex and multidimensional. (It can 
include abstaining from consumption, 
e.g. vows of poverty, dieting, saving, giv-
ing to charity.) In the crossfire of compet-
ing alternatives, SP flags choices and 
draws attention to material satisfactions 
available at a given moment in a given 
place. This is not confined to, but bril-
liantly exemplified in, the supermarket: 
for many shoppers the special offers, the 
discounts, the coupons and games of 
sales promotion are the navigational aids 
they rely on to maximise the gratification 
they derive from shopping. 
People buy food to stay alive, but also 
to enjoy eating it. They dress to keep 
warm, but also to make statements about 
themselves. SP enables them to add an-
other layer of gratification: bargain hunt-
ing, collecting gifts , playing games , 
having fun. 
SP thus works on two levels. Below 
the surface of harmless entertainment, SP 
does its serious job of stimulating eco-
nomic activity. There is clear evidence 
that in the UK severe pressure on food 
and petrol prices (and thereby on the re-
tail price index) is exerted by competitive 
sales promotions in super- and hyper-
markets and on petrol station forecourts 
respectively. Perhaps the fact that the UK 
has among the lowest food and petrol 
prices in Western Europe is not uncon-
nected with its liberal SP regime, although 
no one would claim that this was the sole 
reason for so happy a state of affairs. 
Do I hear cries of 'false gods', bogus 
satisfactions, shoppers being tricked into 
having what they want instead of what 
they ought to have? That the signals emit-
ted by discounts, the blandishments of 
Sales promotion 
gifts , the hopes raised by the possibility of 
winning a prize, lead to the 'wrong 
choices ' - to real gratification perhaps, 
rather than to cholesterol-counted bis-
cuits and sensible shoes? 
Views such as these can indeed still 
be heard. They belong to a diminishing 
band of consumerist dinosaurs fighting 
over a shrinking reservoir of clients. As 
a result of good work done by them in 
the past, and the near-magical efficacy of 
enlightened self-regulation on the part of 
the leading practitioners of the market-
ing arts, the overwhelming majority of 
Victor Ross 
Meanwhile the consumerist bureaucracy 
fails to understand the non-material 
aspects of consumer satisfaction and 
insists on re-fighting battles that have 
long been won. 
consumers have become super-sophisti-
cated, long outdistancing their would-be 
protectors . If there is any threat to them 
today, it comes from their demands hav-
ing become impossibly fragmented, their 
expectations toweringly high. They seek 
out investments that are politically cor-
rect; they want food free of synthetics 
and furs that are nothing but; they know 
their rights and don't want to be patron-
ized; and if there is any doubt, they take 
their pound of flesh and have it weighed 
by a consumer protection official. Mean-
while the consumerist bureaucracy fails 
to understand the non-material aspects 
of consumer satisfaction and insists on 
re-fighting battles that have long been 
won. 
Given that there are only limited re-
sources available to satisfy those ever-in-
creasing expectations, SP, by sharpening 
the tools of competition, works for the 
consumer. 
Here is a model of a typical Reader's 
5 
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Simplified model of Book Sales Campaign 
Option A Option B 
( without SP) (with SP) 
Units Units 
Sales ('OOOs) 200 275 (1) 
Unit sell price 100 94.75 (2) 
Revenue Ax B 20,000 26,056 (3) 
Costs 
SP per unit sold 6.50 (4) 
Product cost p/unit 30 27 (5) 
Total Product Cost (A x E) 60,000 74,250 
Net revenue available to 
cover direct mail, fixed 
and variable costs, 
overheads 
Net profit on 
140,000 168,438 
transaction 5.20% 5.73% 
Digest sales campaign (simplified but not 
falsified) with and without SP. The prod-
uct happens to be a book, the selling 
This constitutes double jeopardy, be-
cause not only does it mean that indi-
viduals are deprived of satisfactions 
that others in the wider market are 
enjoying, but the providers of those 
satisfactions are hamstrung in com-
peting across borders. 
method direct mail, the SP device a . 
sweepstake. The Reader's Digest has con-
ducted hundreds of these in the UK - the 
results vary in magnitude, but never in 
principle. 
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The model reveals interesting aspects 
of SP that spread benefits all round. 
Note 1 
Note 2 
Note 3 
Note 4 
Note 5 
As a result of the combined 
effect of the sweepstake and 
the price reduction, sales 
have increased by 37.5%. 
The price reduction of 5.25% 
would not of itself have pro-
duced the observed increase 
in sales; in fact, it would not 
even have covered its cost. It 
is the multiplier effect of the 
sweepstake and the price re-
duction that drives up sales. 
Revenue goes up almost pro 
rata. 
6.5 is the share contributed 
per unit sale to the cost of the 
incentive, in this case to the 
pool of prizes distributed in a 
sweepstake, a total of 
17,875 (Ax D). 
Another aspect of the virtu-
ous circle: as sales go up, unit 
costs come down, enabling 
the price cut to be even 
deeper. 
In this type of promotion, there are no 
losers . Reader's Digest has made more 
profit both absolutely and percentage-
wise; the customer has paid less for the 
same book, and had the fun of participat-
ing in a sweepstake. The printer has en-
joyed a longer print run. Some lucky 
punters have won prizes. Ultimately the 
tax man will gather in a larger haul. 
The case, convincing though it is, 
must not be allowed to rest there. At this 
moment, consumers all over the EU are 
being denied the tangible as well as the 
intangible benefits of SP. This constitutes 
Commercial Communications January 1997 Safes promotion 
double jeopardy, because not only does 3. The benefits that SP can confer are 
not evenly available throughout the 
EU. Some countries allow free rein 
to SP under a benign system of 
self-regulation; others restrict or 
forbid SP practices in the name of 
preventing allegedly unfair 
competition 
it mean that individuals are deprived of 
satisfactions that others in the wider mar-
ket are enjoying, but the providers of 
those satisfactions are hamstrung in com-
peting across borders. 
And all in the name of unfair compe-
tition. Unfair to whom? To slate as unfair 
the consolidation of a thousand little 
price cuts into a few worthwhile prizes, 4. Such discriminatory availability of a 
proven benefit disadvantages 
consumers who have no access to 
it and inhibits crossborder 
commerce by impeding EU-wide 
campaigns. 
or the addition of pleasure (i.e . value) to 
a purchase with a well-chosen gift - in 
short, the exercise of ingenuity in pro-
viding gratification - is no more sensible 
than calling the craftsman unfair to the 
ham-fisted. 
What a curious change of sides. The 
consumers' champions who once saw so 
clearly the need for regulation to protect 
the unwary from exploitation, have al-
lowed their prejudices to harden into a 
patchwork of producer protection, where 
the fear of competition counts for more 
than the concern for the end user. And in 
losing sight of the end user they have also 
lost sight of the end product of commer-
cial activity which is to make the sales that 
fund the economic life of the country. In 
that sense, SP is a life-enhancing pursuit 
which must be unshackled everywhere 
and allowed to do its vital work. 
Summary 
1. SP performs an important 
economic function: it sharpens 
competition between producers; it 
tends to lower prices of 
merchandise and services; it creates 
awareness of economic 
opportunities. 
2. At the same time, SP performs a 
welcome psychological function 
for the consumer. It adds value to 
what is bought, aids the 
decision-making process, and 
sometimes provides free fun. 
5. The cost of perpetuating 
restrictions on SP, particularly the 
limitation of discounts, premiums 
1be consumers' champions who once saw so 
clearly the needfor regukJtion to protect the 
unwary from exploitation, have allowed their 
prejudices to harden into a patchwork of pro-
ducer protection 
6 
and prices, is incalculable and 
undermines the spirit of free 
enterprise. 
Outmoded notions of unfair 
competition must change when 
that which is being competed for -
the satisfaction of consumer 
demand - has changed. The 
promotion of fair trade is a more 
comprehensive and worthier aim 
than the prevention of unfair 
competition. 
7 
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Sales promotion and 
unfair competition 
Dr. Reiner Munk.er 
Director 
Zentrale zur Bekampfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V. 
(Office of Fair Trading) 
Reiner Munker 
It is appropriate to 
apply the principle 
of performance 
when drawing the 
line betweenfair 
andutifair 
competitive 
practices. 
8 
I. Introduction 
All promotional activities undertaken by a business ultimately serve to promote sales. This entrepreneurial 
effort is expressed by the various types of 
sales promotion campaigns. 
In all European legal systems sales pro-
motions, like any other promotional activity, 
are governed by a legal regulatory frame-
work. As there is no such thing as unrestricted 
competition, sales promotion campaigns 
have to be viewed against the provisions of 
national law which apply and, perhaps, 
against EU regulations relevant to the partirn-
lar case. 
As regards the German legal provisions, 
which are set out in detail below, it needs 
to be understood that this area of law has 
been shaped primarily by the business 
world. The German law against unfair com-
petition grants businesses and business or-
ganisations affected by unfair trading 
practices the right to make civil-law claims. 
No provision is made by the German Act 
Against Unfair Competition (hereinafter 
'UWG') for any kind of state intervention. 
The history of the law shows that legisla-
tive procedures were initiated and followed 
up primarily by business. Business has always 
expressed its determination that fair compe-
tition is a serious matter. Understanding this 
is important, as it explains why the regulatory 
framework should not be rashly branded as 
an obstacle to entrepreneurial activities. 
The purpose of commercial competition 
is its reliance on the principle of perform-
ance. It is therefore appropriate to apply the 
principle of performance when drawing the 
line between fair and unfair competitive 
practices. It forms the basis for the distinction 
between performance-oriented competition 
on the one hand and non-performance-ori-
ented competition on the other (for a de-
tailed discussion see: Baumbach/ Hefermehl, 
Wettbewerbsrecht, 18th Edition, Introduc-
tion UWG, Marginal Note 96). 
Performance-oriented competition is 
positive competition, where each business 
promotes its sales through efficiency. This 
type of competition is to be distinguished 
from non-performance-oriented or negative 
competition. In negative competition, a 
business obstructs its competitors, clearing 
the way for its own sales (Baumbach/ 
Hefermehl , idem). 
It is important to bear in mind that it is 
in the interest of competitors to have a per-
formance-oriented competitive environ-
ment. Equally, consumer protection ranks 
very high, as consumers are to be protected 
from manipulation and misleading practices, 
as well as from discrimination. 
II. Legal regulatory framework 
1. German Law on Gifts 
('Zugabeverordnung') 
The German Law on Gifts generally prohib-
its the granting of a free gift if the gift is 
granted subject to a sales transaction against 
payment. Both the so-called 'main article ' 
and the gift may be either a product or a 
service (Article 1 Paragraph 1, Law on Gifts). 
This general ban on gifts is based on 
the knowledge that the promise of a sup-
posedly free gift constitutes a distortion of 
genuine and performance-oriented compe-
tition, which is based on the price competi-
tiveness and quality of a given product . 
When receiving a free gift the buyer is ma-
nipulated and mislead as to the actual pric-
ing of the article (for further details see 
Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Zugabeverordnung, 
Marginal Note 5). 
This provision is based on a partirnlar 
cost concept. From a businessman's per-
spective, eve1y 'cost-free ' gift ultimately rep-
resents a false calculation , which will 
necessarily be taken into account when cal-
culating the price of the main article and of 
the 'gift '. Thus the consumer does not re-
ceive a particular product or service 'as a 
gift', as suggested. Instead, the consumer 
pays for the gift when buying the main ar-
ticle. The true price of both main article and 
gift have been disguised. 
If gifts were allowed without restriction, 
competition as a whole would have to re-
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sort to this advertising device, as the prac-
tice of handing out free promotional gifts 
has an especially suggestive effect and is 
thus of particular appeal to the consumer. 
However, in view of the way prices are cal-
culated, as outlined above, the general use 
of this advertising device would result in 
the price level for the main article itself be-
ing raised to that of main article plus 'gift'. 
This cost factor cannot be ignored when 
evaluating gifts or other measures forming 
part of 'value' advertising. 
The scope of the German Law on Gifts 
is not limited to business transactions with 
private retail consumers ; it applies to all 
marketing stages, i.e. als_o to transactions 
between manufacturers and retailers. 
However the Law on Gifts does, on the 
guidelines outlined above, admit certain 
gifts, which are listed in Article 1 Paragraph 
2 of the German Law on Gifts. These include 
low value promotional objects (Article 1 
Paragraph 2a); accessories or ancillary serv-
ices customary in trade (Article 1 Paragraph 
2d); and customer magazines (Article 1 Para-
graph 2e). The reimbursement, in part or in 
full , of travel costs for short-distance public 
transport is now also considered an ancillary 
service customary in trade , provided that it 
is adequate in relation to the value of the rel-
evant goods or services (Article 1 Paragraph 
2d, Law on Gifts). 
2. Rebates Act ('Rabattgesetz') 
As with the Law on Gifts, the legislative 
regulations underlying the Rebates Act are 
based on the idea of a ban on rebates in 
principle (Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Re-
bates Act). If a rebate is granted, this rebate 
must have been taken into account in the 
initial price calculation. The Rebates Act, 
which in no way constitutes a tool for the 
protection of small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, depends on the basic idea that 'no 
price discount is granted gratuitously ' 
(Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Rabattgesetz, Mar-
ginal Note 8). It does not deny a business-
man the right to free pricing: after all , it is 
every businessman's task and self-evident 
right to fix his own prices. The Rebates Act 
Sales promotion 
merely ties a businessman to the prices 
stipulated and demanded by him, and it 
does not allow any deviation from these 
prices in individual cases, and/ or for the 
benefit of certain groups of consumers. 
General price reductions do not fall within 
the scope of the Rebates Act. 
Unlike the Law on Gifts, the Rebates 
Act merely applies in relation to the retail 
consumer, who might also be a business-to- If a rebate is 
business customer. However, it provides for t th . 
. f. .b.1. . f . d. gran ed, is spec1 1c poss1 1 1t1es or granting 1scounts 
in this context (Article 9 Number 1 of the rebate must have 
Rebates Act). The Rebates Act does not ap-
ply to transactions between producers and 
retailers, where all rebates are admissible. 
Yet the Rebates Act does not prohibit all 
types of rebates. German law permits rebates 
in special cases when rebates are granted for 
efficiency reasons. This refers first of all to 
volume discounts (Article 7 of the Rebates 
Act). The purchase of a large volume of goods 
reduces the cost of sales for traders. Accord-
ingly traders may pass this benefit on to their 
customers as a volume discount. 
A special provision, Article 13 of the Re-
bates Act bylaw, allows producers of branded 
goods, who do not market their articles di-
rectly but through the retail trade, to reward 
consumers for showing customer loyalty. 
3. Article 1 UWG 
Article 1 of the UWG Act prohibits all unfair 
competitive practices in principle; in deter-
mining whether a practice used in the mar-
ket is fair or unfair, the guiding principle is 
primarily that of a performance-oriented 
competition (see I. above). 
This rule, which is drafted as a blanket 
clause, has proven its usefulness in practice, 
as it enables a flexible response to new 
kinds of advertising practices. The rule is 
based on case law and therefore offers le-
gal certainty when applied in practice. Since 
its creation in 1909, the main categories of 
cases established in practice and by the 
German courts are as follows: touting; ob-
struction; exploitation; breach of the law; 
and market disruption. The categories per-
tinent to the present discussion are touting, 
been taken into 
account in the 
initial price 
calculation. 
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Gifts are not a tool employed in peiformance-
oriented competition; rather, they are a vehicle 
designed to promote the sale of an otherwise 
obviously not very attractive main article by 
disguising its price. 
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particularly by means of 'value' advertising, 
and obstruction. 
4. Article 3 UWG: prohibition of mis-
leading advertising 
It should be added that the general prohibi-
tion of misleading advertising is another ob-
vious framework regulation which applies to 
sales promotions. The prohibition of mis-
leading advertising is likely to form part of 
any competition regime; not least is the way 
it is given particular expression on a Euro-
pean level in the form of Directive 84/ 450. 
Ill. Sales Promotions in practice 
and their legal evaluation 
1. Gifts 
Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the German Law on 
Gifts prohibits the use of gifts in sales pro-
motions for the reasons outlined above (un-
der II .1). Gifts are not a tool employed in 
performance-oriented competition; rather, 
they are a vehicle designed to promote the 
sale of an otherwise obviously not very at-
tractive main article by disguising its price. 
This ban on gifts is consistently applied by 
German law in the interest of a perform-
ance-oriented competition. 
Take the example of the following pro-
motion: 'Two meals for the price of one'. 
Here consumers were invited to pur-
chase special vouchers from a catering es-
tablishment before the actual meal. They 
were asked to use these vouchers to pay for 
one meal: the meal for the second person 
was free. This type of advertising is prohib-
ited under German law (BGH WRP 91, 
page 648 - 'Two for One') . 
Even the offer of 'free car transport' as 
part of a ferry crossing for a family of several 
people is unlawful (OLG Hamburg, WRP 78, 
page 900). This example is a particularly 
clear illustration. The car transport cannot be 
cost-free: its high value must have been 
taken into account when calculating the to-
tal price of the ferry crossing. The real price 
was thus concealed and the consumers were 
deceived. 
2. Sales contests offered to the trade 
A form of advertising popularly used by 
Commercial Communications January 1997 
manufacturers is the offer of sales contests 
to the trade. Such sales contests generally 
take place in the form of campaigns of lim-
ited duration offering, say, a particular pre-
mium if a certain quantity of goods is 
purchased. Such premiums constitute a gift 
and are therefore not admissible. 
Sales contests may also be in the form of 
a free draw for valuable prizes amongst the 
'best' in a competition. Such incentives carry 
the danger that the retailer might, during sales 
talks with his customers, no longer advise the 
customer according to objective criteria; in-
stead, his marketing activities, including the 
advice given to customers, might be governed 
by the wish to win the sales contest. Influenc-
ing the market process in such a way is 
incompatible with the principle of a perform-
ance-oriented competition (for further details 
see: Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Article 1 UWG, 
Marginal Note 898). 
3. Loyalty rewards 
A reward for loyalty granted by a producer 
of branded goods to his loyal customers by 
means of special coupons does not consti-
tute a gift. This type of sales promotion is 
admissible according to German law (Arti-
cle 13 of the Rebates Act bylaw); however, 
there is an upper limit to the actual amount 
of the loyalty reward. A loyalty reward may 
constitute up to 10 per cent of the value of 
the branded article (BGH WRP 81, page 91 
- 'Rama-Madchen') . 
4. Special offers 
Sales promotion may also take place as re-
duced offers of a limited period. 
The retail trade itself can speed up the 
clearance sale of certain goods by means of 
special offers (Article 7 Paragraph 2 UWG). 
There is, however, a limit to such promo-
tions: reduced offers may not be grouped 
so as to leave the public with the impres-
sion that a bargain sale of a substantial part 
of the product range is taking place (Article 
7 Paragraph 1 UWG). 
Similarly, manufacturers are free to try 
to promote the sales of their products 
through the retail trade by setting their 
prices in a particularly favourable way. 
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Manufacturers are not, however, al-
lowed to influence competition by, for ex-
ample , prescribing particular prices to the 
retail trade (Article 15 of the German Act 
Against Restraints of Competition). Such 
restraint of competition is inadmissible, 
both explicitly and through sales messages 
to the consumer, as such messages ulti-
mately exert an indirect influence on the 
retail trade to adopt the prices fixed by the 
producer (cf. Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Article 
1 UWG, Marginal Note 901). 
Consider the promotion by a confection-
ery manufacturer who printed on the pack-
ages of his products: '4 for the price of 3'. 
In doing this, the manufacturer ulti-
mately forced retailers to sell this promotion 
pack, which was larger than the normal 
pack, for the same price (BGH WRP 78, 
page 371 - '4 zum Preis von 3'). 
The European Court of Justice refers to 
this aspect - i.e . manufacturers influencing 
retailers' pricing and its prohibition by na-
tional German law - in its 'Mars decision' 
(EC], judgment dated 6 July 1995, Ref. C 
470/ 93 , reprinted in WRP 95 , page 677). 
The European Court of Justice justifies 
overruling the antitrust provision in Article 
15 of the Act Against Restraints of Competi-
tion by saying that the constraint imposed 
upon retailers not to increase prices during 
the promotional period is of benefit to the 
consumer. This argument is, however, not 
conclusive. Ultimately retailers cannot afford 
to 'give away free gifts'. If retailers cannot in-
crease prices with such promotions, they will 
make up for it by resorting to mixed costing 
and take this item into account in some other 
way. This does not benefit the consumer and 
the non-application of Article 15 of the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition is not jus-
tified. Moreover, the ECJ's reasoning is con-
tradictory as it justifies a practice restricting 
competition in respect of trading between 
manufacturers and retailers with consumer 
protection concerns. 
It is therefore doubtful whether Euro-
pean law ultimately calls for and/or justifies 
a restraint of national competition in rela-
Sales promotion 
tions between manufacturers and retailers. 
5. Promotion Packs 
In practice, sales promotions are often real-
ised by selling a particular pack of goods 
and adding an extra article, which may or 
may not be related to the main goods. Of-
ten such promotions are intended by busi-
ness to make consumers who purchase a 
particular article from 'their' producer aware 
of the diversity of the product range. 
This is to be welcomed in principle , 
particularly in relation to performance-ori-
ented competition. There are, however, lim-
its to this type of promotion where the 
enclosed article leads to the price of the 
main product being disguised. 
The German Law on Gifts also applies 
to promotion packs. These have to be de-
signed in such a way as to avoid the impres-
sion that the enclosed article is 'free' . 
Moreover, if an unrelated extra is en-
closed with the main article the tie-in of 
goods thus achieved might mean that the 
customer is unable to draw a distinction 
between his price expectations in respect of 
the main article on the one hand and that 
of the enclosed extra on the other. Extras 
that are alien to the original product will 
therefore often need to be made available 
individually and independently of the pro-
motion pack. Only then can the consumer 
get a clear idea of the pricing for the indi-
vidual items in the promotion pack. 
Producers wishing to attract consumers 
by means of performance-oriented compe-
tition should not, and would not want to, 
raise any objections to this practice. 
6. Lotteries 
The organisation of draws and lotteries has 
always had a particular importance in sales 
promotion. In consumers' eyes, draws and 
lotteries are particularly alluring and thus 
particularly efficient. They are a way for the 
businessman to gain the attention of the 
public and to get consumers specifically in-
terested in the products on offer. Such com-
petition for consumers' attention embodies 
the performance idea on which positive 
competition is based. 
If retailers cannot 
increase prices 
with such 
promotions, they 
will make up for 
it by resorting to 
mixed costing and 
take this item into 
account in some 
other way. 
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defenceless against 
such behaviour. .. 
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By contrast, the term 'negative compe-
tition' applies where lottery promotions are 
not limited to getting consumers' attention 
but to entice consumers, in the way the par-
ticular lottery promotion is organised, to 
purchase a product merely in order to be 
able to take part in the lottery. Linking the 
sale of a product with participation in a 
draw is therefore an unfair competitive 
practice (cf. Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Article 1 
UWG, Marginal Note 155). 
Nor can such link-ups between the sale 
of goods and participation in a draw be jus-
tified from the consumers ' perspective. 
Consumers have to be able to decide freely , 
on the basis of quality and price competi-
tiveness , whether they wish to purchase a 
given product. If a consumer's passion for 
gaming is exploited by, either directly or 
indirectly, linking the sale of a product with 
a draw, the consumer's perception of the 
objective arguments for and against buying 
this product becomes blurred. 
7. Sample promotions 
When launching a new product it is of con-
siderable importance for the producer to 
present the new product to as many people 
as possible and to gain consumers for this 
product. Apart from using a wide range of 
commercial communications techniques, 
this may also be achieved by handing out 
merchandise samples to customers, so cus-
tomers can judge the quality of the product 
being promoted for themselves. 
Providing households with merchandise 
samples, even on a large scale, is in accord-
ance with performance-oriented competi-
tion. Sample promotions do not obstruct 
competition in an unfair manner, as competi-
tors can continue to offer their services un-
restricted. Moreover, consumer interests are 
not violated because customers can compare 
all services on offer and are free to decide 
and choose (cf. Baumbach/ Hefermehl, Arti-
cle 1 UWG, Marginal Note 856). 
On the other hand, competition is not 
performance-oriented when the large-
scale distribution of free articles extends 
not just to samples but to the actual prod-
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uct itself and therefore results in the mar-
ket being distorted. Such competitive be-
haviour can only be adopted by a very 
well funded supplier. Competitors who 
might not have the same financial resources 
are defenceless against such behaviour; 
what is more, they are restricted in their 
competitive activities through the exercise 
of one competitor's overwhelming market 
power (cf. Baumbach/ Hefermehl, idem). 
From the point of view of performance-
oriented competition, there can be no jus-
tification for giving away original goods 
cost-free and in large numbers, especially as 
this will result in the market being distorted. 
If a business wishes to draw the attention of 
consumers to a new product and to provide 
them with the possibility of sampling the 
product itself, a merchandise sample is per-
fectly sufficient. 
IV. Conclusion 
The fair trade rules outlined above as well as 
their practical application leave businesses 
with a large scope for using sales promotions 
within the framework of real and positive 
competition. A business might wish to draw 
the public's attention to a product through a 
special offer and thus help clear stocks. Al-
ternatively, it might use promotion packs to 
direct the attention of customers to another 
product from its diverse product range. Busi-
nesses can highlight their range of products 
by means of lotteries. Or they can launch a 
new product by handing out samples to con-
sumers . These possibilities cover a wide 
scope within which businesses can organise 
positive competition, i.e. performance-ori-
ented competition. 
However, in the context of sales promo-
tions businesses are not allowed to obstruct 
their competitors through the use of tools 
unrelated to their performance, nor may they 
deceive consumers as to the actual pricing 
and thus adversely affect the freedom of con-
sumers to make up their own minds. Such 
behaviour cannot be justified from the point 
of view of positive competition. 
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Do promotions need 
media support? Abbas Bendall Research Director 
EuroRSCG 
The advent of barcodes and scan-ning technology has revolutionized the process of gathering data for 
large-scale panel research. The immediate 
consequences for end-users of this re-
search have been: 
• more frequent information 
• greater reliability 
• greater precision. 
Organisations that have traditionally 
carried out large-scale panel research on 
consumers and retailers have gradually 
changed their methods to make use of 
this new technology. 
In this context, Nielsen and Euromedia 
have been operating a joint research 
project in France known as SYSMIC since 
1991 , to measure the effectiveness of ad-
vertising and promotions. Essentially, this 
work has made it possible to establish an 
ongoing correlation between Nielsen pan-
ellists' purchasing behaviour and their ex-
posure to the media. 
The role of Nielsen's marketing data 
and their media component SYSMIC has 
paved new ground in marketing research 
in general, and advertising effectiveness 
research in particular. 
In order to respond to the needs of con-
sumer products advertisers, Mediapolis, 
Nielsen, NRJ Regies and M6 Publicite have 
carried out a joint research project aiming to 
quantify the impact of manufacturers' pro-
motions supported by television and radio 
advertising. 
Major-brand promotional campaigns 
are becoming increasingly frequent, par-
ticularly on television; examples include 
bingo games and cash-back offers. 
The main aim of such promotions is 
to influence the consumer's short-term 
behaviour. They serve a different function 
to traditional advertising, whose primary 
purpose is to develop the image of a 
brand, and which therefore has more 
long-term objectives. 
We need therefore to look at whether 
these promotions are achieving their aim 
of generating short-term sales. 
The results of this work constitute the 
first stage of the project. This is a descrip-
tive stage, whose main objective is to re-
view the situation and identify the main 
priorities for future research in this area. 
Survey methodology Major-brand 
Manufacturers' promotions are an impor- promotional 
tant way of stimulating sho1t-term sales or campaigns are 
generating consumer loyalty. They are becoming 
different from retailer promotions which 
are primarily aimed at the point of sale increasingly 
and which might include the provision of frequent, 
shelf signage and leaflets. . la l 
P . k d'fC particu ~~ on romot1ons may ta e many 1 1erent 
forms, including: cash back offers; corn- television 
petitions; extra quantities of the product; 
loyalty vouchers; coupons or prize draws. 
Scope of survey 
For reasons concerned with the availabil-
ity of information, standardisation of data 
and the usability of the results, the scope 
of the survey was limited to the following: 
food products; single-product manufac-
turers' promotions; television and radio; 
and recent campaigns, carried out be-
tween January 1994 and June 1995. 
Methodology 
This survey required the use of large-
scale, sophisticated research tools (see 
'Resources used'). In order to define and 
describe these campaigns and then quan-
tify their impact, data was obtained from 
three different sources: 
• The media: quantitative and quali-
tative details of spending; 
• Retailers: sales volumes, products 
available, prices, level of promotion; 
• Consumers: observing purchasing 
behaviour based on promotions in the 
stores they use and their exposure to the 
media. 
Using the SECODIP qualitative data-
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Offers of cash 
back now or later 
were by far the 
mnst commnnform 
of manufacturers' 
promotions, and 
infact were those 
mnst often given 
media support 
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base, 26 campaigns were identified as 
complying with the survey constraints. 
We used a combination of all the vari-
ous methods we had available to analyse 
variations in sales of brands before, during 
and after the media campaign in the light 
of the product mix variables: nature of pro-
motion (extra quantity, cash back offer, 
competition etc); stock levels of products 
being promoted; profile of the brand and 
its market (market leader/ challenger, de-
gree of market fragmentation, own-brands 
market share); amount of advertising 
(budget, frequency, length of campaign); 
media mix (radio, TV, or both); content of 
TV commercial; amount of promotion by 
retailers; attractiveness of price . We also 
considered these household behaviour 
pattern variables: frequency of purchase; 
share of purchases and degree of expo-
sure to media campaigns. 
Description of campaigns 
The campaigns analysed covered the ma-
jority of the brands in the food sector. 
More than three quarters of the cam-
paigns related to coffee , chocolate, dairy 
and meat products. 
Offers of cash back now or later were 
by far the most common form of manufac-
turers' promotions, and in fact were those 
most often given media support. Competi-
tions and extra-quantity offers were the sec-
ond most common form of promotion used 
by advertisers. Loyalty vouchers, purchase 
coupons and prize draws represented only 
20% of the campaigns analysed. 
The campaigns were divided roughly 
equally between television ( 46%) and ra-
dio (42%). One in ten campaigns used a 
mix of the two media. 
The media budgets allocated to these 
campaigns were significant: the gross 
spend on TV was FF 8. 5 million, and on 
radio FF 2.5 million. This was twice the 
normal budget for the food sector. 
In the case of television, this high 
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level of spending occurred because tradi-
tional image advertising was being car-
ried out alongside promotions. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note 
that two thirds of the TV commercials for 
the promotion were based on the content 
of the image commercial, and the remain-
ing one third were made specifically for 
the promotion. 
It was possible for a product to be 
promoted on TV or radio but not to be 
widely available in the stores, because 
only one in two products had their stock 
levels increased significantly. 
This apparent contradiction can partly 
be explained by: 
• The relatively long period of time 
taken by the product to be transported 
from the factory to the warehouse and 
then to the shelf in the store. In the case 
of food products, this can sometimes take 
three months. It is possible for there to be 
a time-lag between the promotion being 
advertised in the media and sufficient 
quantities being available in the shops. 
• Details of manufacturers ' promo-
tions are not always given on the packag-
ing of the product, and the customer may 
therefore not be aware of them. 
Categories of campaigns 
As a result of this survey, the campaigns 
were divided into three categories based 
on the change in market share which oc-
curred. 
Category 1 (20% of cases): market 
share remained unchanged or fell slightly 
(2% to 4%) 
This category contained mainly the 
leading brands in markets where own 
brands had a large share. This category 
had the highest level of brand loyalty of 
the three. 
In most cases , the media campaign 
for the promotion had a significant 
budget (averaging FF 9 million for TV and 
FF 4.6 million for radio) and followed an 
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image campaign which had been run in 
the previous weeks. 
Category 2 ( 45%): market share in-
creased by 3% to 10%. 
This category had the lowest level of 
media support of the three categories, 
with an average budget of FF 3.2 million 
for TV and FF 1.3 million for radio. 
Manufacturers' promotions were usu-
ally 'money back later' offers with little 
advertising at the point of sale. However, 
total sales of the brands increased by sev-
eral percentage points during and after 
the promotion. 
Category 3 (35%): market share in-
creased by more than 10%. 
These involved a significant level of 
media spend, with a budget averaging FF 
12.5 million for TV and FF 3.4 million for 
radio, and the campaign often lasted 
longer than the product purchase cycle. 
These were brands competing in a frag-
mented market, with no dominant market 
leader and with a high volume of adver-
tising. There was also significant product 
support in the form of retailer promo-
tions. The brands had the least stable 
market share of the three categories. 
Extra-quantity offers and competi-
tions were over-represented in this group. 
The main lessons of the survey 
Eight out of ten media-supported promo-
tions led to a gain in market share for the 
brand. Half the promotions led to a sig-
nificant gain which often continued after 
the campaign. 
Analysing the characteristics of these 
three categories, we can identify those 
variables that determine the impact of 
media-backed promotions on sales. 
There are a number of these vari-
ables. They are linked to the following 
factors: the type of promotion the manu-
facturer decides to use; whether the prod-
uct is actually on the shelves; the support 
given by retailers in the form of point-of-
Promotion and advertising 
sale promotions and the amount of media 
advertising for the promotion. 
Type of manufacturer's promotion 
and market for brand 
Some manufacturers' promotions have a 
greater effect on sales than others, despite 
having the same media budget. This is 
true of extra-quantity offers and compe-
titions, provided the manufacturer does 
not have unrealistically high expectations 
of the potential gain. 
However, the type of promotion must 
be tailored to the level of competition 
within the market. This will depend on 
whether the brand is a leader or chal-
lenger, the relative market share of own 
brands and premium brands, and the de-
gree of loyalty enjoyed by the different 
brands in the market. 
Logistics and retailer support 
The product must be available on the 
shelves in the maximum possible number 
of points of sale when the media cam-
paign is launched. This might seem like 
common sense, but it is not always the 
case. 
Once the product is available at the 
point of sale, the campaign will be more 
effective if the various forms of retailer 
support are provided in tandem with the 
media campaign, rather than separately. 
Use of media Some manufacturers' 
This survey brought out at least two im-
portant facts: prvmotions have a 
1. There is no one media mix that is greater ~eel on sales 
more effective than others when it comes 
to advertising a promotion. Each of the 
three categories included campaigns that 
had been advertised on radio, television or 
a combination of the two. If the promotion 
is to be effective, it is essential that the 
image campaign be properly tied in with 
the promotional campaign. 
2. The amount of money spent on 
campaigns is an essential factor in their 
impact. It is important to decide whom 
the advertising for a brand is targeting: 
than others, despite 
having the same 
media budget 
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Resources used 
SCANTRACK, performance measurement: The Nielsen retailer panel; 
450 large and medium-sized points of sale with scanner checkouts, lo-
cated throughout France; week-on-week monitoring of brand sales in-
dicators; weekly survey of point-of-sale promotions, particularly retailer 
promotions (highlighting particular products, price cuts and leaflets) 
SCAN 9000, the consumer survey: The Nielsen consumer panel; 9,000 
panel households using approximately 40 large stores with scanners; 
ongoing, computerized survey of purchases at checkout using a magnetic 
card to identify the panellist; weekly survey of point-of-sale promotions, 
and particularly retailer and manufacturers' promotions. 
SYSMIC, link between purchasing behaviour and amount of advertising 
and promotion: SYSMIC is the media component of SCAN 9000, pro-
duced in partnership between Nielsen and Euromedia; six-monthly sur-
vey of exposure to media (TV, radio, press, cinema); audiences 
extrapolated using market reference data (Mediametrie, AEPM). 
MEDIA SURVEY, monitoring and identifying the amount of advertising 
for the brand and its competitors: SECODIP survey; quantitative survey 
of media spending (sector, product, medium, amount); qualitative sur-
vey (type of advertisement, sound recording or video). 
Category 1 
Brand A 
Category 2 
Brand B 
Category 3 
Brand C 
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• retailers, to encourage them to 
stock more of the product and thus cre-
ate a more favourable environment for 
commercial negotiations, or 
• both retailers and the consumers at 
whom the promotion is aimed. 
The retailers ' response will be re-
flected in their levels for the brand; in 
most cases, the message is conveyed ef-
fectively. 
However, the consumer's response in 
terms of buying the product will depend 
on how much they have seen the promo-
tion advertised in the media and at the 
point of sale. 
The following graph uses examples 
from each of the three categories of cam-
paign to show the change in market share 
among two groups of people before and 
after the campaign: 
- both groups had seen the promo-
tion advertised at the point of sale; 
- however, one group had also seen 
it advertised in the media and the other 
Market Share before and after the campaign 
(100 = Market share 'before') 
Exposed I I 90 
~========: 
Not exposed I I 89 
Exposed I j 103 
:===========~~ 
Not exposed .._I ---------'--'j 82 
Exposed I j 169 
:==========::;-----~ 
Not exposed .._! -------~ 
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had not. 
In Category 1, the product's market 
share decreased or stayed the same for 
both groups. 
In Category 2, there was an increase 
in market share among the group who 
had seen the media campaign. Advertis-
ing the promotion at the point of sale but 
not in the media did not lead to an in-
crease in market share. 
Finally, in Category 3 it can be seen 
that a manufacturer's promotion adver-
tised at the point of sale and also given 
significant media support resulted in an 
increased market share. 
Conclusion 
It goes without saying that measuring the 
effectiveness of advertising, and thus the. 
return on one's media spend, is a com-
plex process involving many variables. 
However, if we look only at fast-mov-
ing consumer goods, the information 
available using scanning technology 
means that we can directly measure the 
effect of advertising and promotions on 
sales. 
This survey of media-supported pro-
motions has enabled us to look at the 
links between two key variables in the 
product mix and two important consumer 
product strategies: promotions with and 
without media support. 
Clearly , the two are very closely 
linked, and if they are properly organised 
they will have a mutually reinforcing ef-
fect. People are exposed to a great deal of 
advertising; they are more likely to notice 
point-of-sale advertising for a promotion 
if they have already seen it advertised in 
the media, and vice versa. 
This research will be continued and 
expanded to include other sectors (drinks, 
health and beauty products, and cleaning 
products). It will also include other media, 
and particularly the press, which is often 
used to publicise promotions. 
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Commercial Communications -
a Green Paper that 
will fail to please . 
Introduction and Summary 
The Internal Market was supposed to have been completed by the end of 1992. It has taken until mid-1996 
for the European Commission to publish 
a Green Paper which confirms that there 
is little or no coherence or consistency 
across Europe as to how marketing 
should be regulated. The central conclu-
sions of the Green Paper, Commercial 
Communications in the Internal Market, 
are that differing national regulations can 
create obstacles for cross-border trade 
and that the situation may get worse with 
the creation of further divergences and 
with the growth of new 'Information So-
ciety ' services, such as direct selling 
through the Internet. 
Businesses, consumers and the pub-
lic at large have much to gain from an ex-
panding and healthy Internal Market. In 
principle, a business should be able to 
sell its goods or services anywhere within 
the Community and consumers should be 
able to buy from anywhere. Commercial 
communications are essential for that 
goal, but there are perfectly legitimate 
reasons for a range of regulatory restric-
tions on the content and manner of com-
mercial communications. 
The Green Paper outlines 'basic 
policy orientations'. The aim is to tackle 
existing regulations which create barriers 
to cross-border marketing and to ensure 
that future measures ( whether at national 
or Community level) are developed in 
conformity with 'Community objectives', 
particularly the promotion of the Internal 
Market. This is primarily to be achieved 
with an 'assessment methodology' to en-
sure that initiatives are precisely targeted 
on public interest objectives and do not 
amount to unlawful barriers to trade. This 
will rely largely upon attempts to apply 
'proportionality' tests - deciding whether 
a restrictive measure goes beyond that 
Richard Thomas 
Director of Public Policy 
Clifford Chance 
which is necessary to achieve legitimate 
objectives. 
Unfortunately, the Green Paper's ap-
proach represents a missed opportunity. 
The proposals are over-ambitious and (it 
is feared) unworkable. Moreover: 
• Commercial interests 
- will regret that the proposals are some-
what abstract and bureaucratic and have 
not been prioritised; 
- will be disappointed with the failure to 
give any concrete commitment to tackle 
manifestly unjustifiable restrictions. 
• Consumer and public interest groups 
- will fear a de-regulatory programme di-
rected at dismantling safeguards and 
protections which address legitimate con-
cerns without any coherent approach to 
erecting substitute arrangements; 
- will regret the absence of any commit-
ment to take firm action against phoney 
protectionism. 
• Political interests 
- will be reluctant to address areas of high 
controversy which appear to challenge 
national interests and/ or conflict with 
principles of subsidiarity. 
Despite the likely problems with the 
Commission's proposals, there is a need 
for a workable programme of action. 
This response concludes with a suggested 
way forward. The starting point has to be 
a concrete Statement of those types of 
restriction which are considered to be le-
gitimate and proportionate and those 
which are not. On the basis of such an 
approach it may be possible to bring for-
ward suitable Community legislation. It 
will certainly be possible to identify those 
national restrictions which are blatantly 
incompatible with Community law with a 
view to infringement proceedings. There 
is also a need for the Commission to ad-
dress self-regulatory measures, redress 
and - above all - cross-border enforce-
ment. 
Urifortunately, the 
Green Paper's 
approach repre-
sents a missed 
opportunity. 
The proposals are 
over-ambitious and 
(it is feared) 
unworkable 
17 
Missed opportunity 
The right approach is to develop a bench-mark in 
terms of what is recognised as legitimate and 
proportionate as the subject matter of regulatory 
restriction and then to review individual national 
restrictions against that coherent framework 
18 
What has Gone Wrong? 
These proposals are however over-ambi-
tious and represent a missed opportunity. 
It is feared that - as currently put forward 
- they are doomed to failure. It is possible 
to suggest some of the problems which 
lie behind the disappointments of the 
Green Paper: 
1. In particular there is little acknowl-
edgement that: 
• In any market, a basic framework of 
regulation and/ or self-regulation is needed 
by all players (users, suppliers , carriers, 
consumers and others) if advertising and 
other marketing efforts are to command 
public confidence and achieve effective-
ness. This is as important for the commer-
cial communications industry (not least to 
build trust and acceptability for their mes-
sages) as it is for those on the receiving 
end. In terms of public policy and public 
acceptability, it will be extraordinarily dif-
ficult to mount a de-regulatory ('disman-
tling') programme purely in the name of 
Community principles. 
• It would be a Herculean (and prob-
ably impossible) exercise to identify and 
disentangle the explicit and envisaged 
policy objectives of thousands of different 
national regulations and their detailed 
sub-provisions. 
• Behind each such regulation, there lies 
a complex web of political, historical, cul-
tural and other circumstantial motivations. 
Each regulation, however imperfectly, rep-
resents the manifestation of democratic de-
cision-making within the Member State 
where it was adopted, usually reflecting a 
mix of national aspirations, concerns and 
values. 
• The regulation of advertising and 
other forms of marketing is a sensitive 
and controversial topic, where passions 
can quickly be aroused if familiar safe-
guards are seen to be threatened from 
remote sources. The Green Pa per does 
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not satisfactorily address subsidiarity is-
sues or the problems of challenging 
deeply-held traditions and systems built 
up over many years. De-regulation can be 
an assault on the principle of subsidiarity 
as much as regulation. 
• Commercial communications seek to 
inform and to persuade. They will only be 
effective if they are acceptable to the tar-
get audience and to the social, cultural and 
legal norms of that audience. The audi-
ence is always local. The existence of the 
Euro-Consumer (except in relatively niche 
areas) remains elusive. Direct marketing 
prospers by focusing on the different char-
acteristics of target audiences. Even where 
marketeers are ready to 'Think Global .. ' 
they are advised to ' .. Act Local'. Most mar-
keteers will wish to ensure compliance 
with local values and acceptability. Leav-
ing aside language and social barriers, few 
marketeers would wish to support a mar-
keting mix, which may be consistent with 
Community law, but which flouts the local 
regulatory traditions. The Green Paper ac-
knowledges that the Commission's survey 
revealed that more users named cultural 
problems as impeding trade than men-
tioned regulatory problems. Indeed, only 
19% thought that regulatory problems 
were the most serious, while 92% felt they 
had encountered cultural difficulties. Car-
riers, consumer associations and self-regu-
latory authorities all also thought that 
culture was a key concern. 
2. The proposed approach starts at the 
wrong end. The proposed starting-point is 
each national restriction, assessed by ref-
erenc e to jurisprudential criteria. The 
right approach is to develop a benchmark 
in terms of what is recognised as legiti-
mate and proportionate as the subject 
matter of regulatory restriction and then 
to review individual national restrictions 
against that coherent framework. 
3. There is no recognition of the role 
which can be played by effective self-regu-
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lation. In particular, one might expect a 
discussion about the scope for pan-Euro-
pean self-regulation as a substitute for na-
tional regulation. If the overall thrust is to 
be de-regulatory, self-regulation ( where it 
can be made to work) could play an im-
portant part in maintaining the necessary 
standards, protections and benefits which 
are currently achieved through divergent 
legal provisions. 
4. There is no discussion of the ma-
chinery through which consumers (and 
others adversely affected) may seek com-
pensatory redress in respect of offending 
marketing materials which originate in 
another Member State. 
5. There is virtually no discussion of 
enforcement machinery. The systems, re-
sources and policies which are put in 
place for enforcing national regulations 
are often more important than the sub-
stance of the regulations themselves. This 
applies two ways - adequate enforcement 
to ensure effectiveness of regulatory 
measures and over-zealous or discrimina-
tory enforcement as a barrier to trade. 
6. Nor is there any acknowledgement 
of the need for machinery to prevent the 
despatch of offending materials from one 
Member State to another. 
7. The reliance which the proposals 
place upon rather imprecise administrative 
and bureaucratic processes will frustrate 
those (producers and consumers) who do 
wish to attack blatant national regulations 
which are discriminatory in effect and im-
possible to justify objectively. 
What is to be done? 
The Commission should abandon its 
proposals for a mechanistic, but abstract, 
'assessment methodology'. Likewise little 
benefit is seen in establishing the pro-
posed Committee. It should also aban-
don its proposed 'scatter-gun' approach, 
substantially reducing its range of initial 
targets. 
Missed opportunity 
A simpler, better-targeted and more 
effective approach is needed if any worth-
while progress is actually to be made with 
the removal of unacceptable barriers. Tbe 
starting point should be to build wide-
spread support for a balanced overall ob-
jective, for example: 
'To ensure that regulatory restrictions 
and enforcement practice which impact 
on Commercial Communications are as 
consistent as possible across the Internal 
Market, while respecting protections and 
safeguards which are considered accept-
able and appropriate to achieve defined 
general interest objectives.' 
A programme to achieve such an ob-
jective might then proceed along the fol-
lowing lines: 
1. The Commission (in full consulta-
tion with all interested parties) should de-
velop a comprehensive, authoritative and 
(above all) concrete Statement of the types 
of regulatory restriction impacting on com-
mercial communications which are consid-
ered to be unjustified or disproportionate 
by reference to stated 'general interest' 
objectives. This will provide the central 
and objective benchmark (rather than ab-
stract criteria) for reviewing national re-
strictions. This would be case-by-case by 
The Commission should abandon its proposals 
for a mechanistic, but abstract, 'assessment 
methodology: Likewise little benefit is seen in 
establishing the proposed Committee 
reference to the types of restriction, rather 
than starting case-by-case with individual 
national measures. 
2. In other words, what is needed is: 
a) an elaboration of general interest 
objectives in terms of the goals which it 
is considered to be legitimate to achieve 
through regulatory activity; and 
b) a clear indication, as a matter of pro-
portionality, of the types of regulatory activ-
19 
Missed opportunity 
This exercise will 
not be easy, but it 
will have a balanced 
andfocused 
methodology which 
should command 
widespread 
support. 
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ity which go beyond acceptable limits for 
the achievement of each such objective. 
3. Using and adapting the Commis-
sion's Regulatory Tables, the Table op-
posite sets out for initial consideration 
and discussion a tentative framework to 
indicate the ground which needs to be 
covered in developing the proposed 
statement. 
4. This exercise will not be easy, but it 
will have a balanced and focused method-
ology which should command widespread 
support. The central challenge, which is 
both a technical and a political process, 
will be, for each objective, to specify the 
grounds for deciding on which side of the 
acceptability/ proportionality boundary 
particular types of restriction will fall. It is 
suspected that - given a suitable lead from 
the Commission - a surprising degree of 
consensus may emerge between commer-
cial and consumer/ public interests on 
most (though not all) issues which may 
well 'squeeze' purely national interests. 
Even if not 100%, this would provide a 
solid foundation. 
5. Once broad agreement has been 
reached on the content of such a state-
ment, there are two main (though not 
mutually exclusive) options for the Com-
mission. It could use the statement as the 
basis for legislative proposals directed at 
achieving a coherent and consistent ap-
proach to the regulation of commercial 
communications across the Internal Mar-
ket which would command widespread 
commercial , public and political confi-
dence . 
6. Alternatively - or additionally - the 
Commission should use the statement to 
pursue a genuinely case-by-case strategy, 
initially focusing on a small number of 
national restrictions which are considered 
to be particularly objectionable as unjusti-
fied and/ or excessive barriers to trade . 
(For example an outright ban on a particu-
lar type of sales promotion or on advertis-
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ing by professionals might be selected for 
the initial review.) In appropriate cases, 
infringement proceedings under Article 
169 of the EC Treaty should be threatened 
and commenced. 
7. Alongside the above activity, the 
Commission should actively support 
efforts by the European Advertising 
Standards Alliance (EASA) and others to 
establish instruments of pan-European 
self-regulation, consistent with the elabo-
rated general interest objectives, which 
will be effective (in substance and en-
forcement) and widely-respected. 
8. The Commission should work with 
enforcement bodies within Member 
States (and the International Marketing 
Supervision Network) to bring forward 
legislative proposals for preventing the 
despatch of commercial communications 
from one Member State to another where 
such communications: 
(a) would be unlawful in the Host 
Country .. . 
(b) ... under regulations which are ac-
ceptable within the parameters of the 
statement. 
9. As a related, but separate, exercise 
there may be a case for the Commission 
to develop European or global proposals 
for a balanced approach to the regulation 
of commercial communications which 
use the Internet and other forms of elec-
tronic distance selling. This is an area 
where: 
• there is little specific regulation at the 
moment; 
• existing national regulations directed 
at commercial communications in general 
are either ineffective or have unintended 
consequences; 
• there is less scope for political and 
public controversy in defence of a status 
quo; 
• there is an obvious need for an inter-
national approach. 
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GENERAL INTEREST TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS 
OBJECTIVE WHICH NEEDS CONSIDERED TO BE CONSIDERED TO BE 
TO BE FORMULATED PROPORTIONATE AND DISPROPORTION A TE AND 
ACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE 
Privacy * Bans on intrusive advertising * Outright bans on any form of direct 
(e.g. cold calling, telephone approach to recipients 
marketing), where recipient has 
not given adequate consent 
Protection of Minors * Restrictions requiring special * Outright bans on all forms of 
measures when communicating communications directed at children 
with minors (e.g. warnings, 
parental consent) 
* Outright bans on specific types * Outright ban on advertising of toys 
of communication (e.g. credit, 
gambling, tobacco, alcohol) 
Public Morality * Requirements reflecting * Taste/decency standards which 
widely-accepted standards of cannot be justified in such terms 
taste/decency within the Member 
State 
* Bans on advertising which -
discriminates in terms of race, sex 
etc . 
* Requirements which reflect -
respect for minorities, women etc 
* Requirements which reflect * Bans/restrictions which cannot be 
other defined societal values justified in such terms 
Public Health * Acceptable restrictions affecting [For discussion] 
tobacco, alcohol, food and 
pharmaceuticals (for discussion) 
Consumer Protection * Bans on deceptive or misleading -
claims 
* Limitations on activities which * Unjustified bans on sales promotions 
may impose undue influence, e.g. 
discounts, promotional gifts, 
concessionary offers, 
competitions, prize draws 
* Provisions promoting market * Bans on comparative advertising 
transparency 
* Provisions imposing particular -
requirements for financial services 
* Unjustified bans on advertising by 
professionals 
* Other restrictions which impede fair 
competition 
Protection of Intellectual * Bans or restrictions which go 
Property Rights beyond what is necessary for 
legitimate protection of intellectual 
property rights 
Professional Ethics * Libel/slander rules * Excessive restrictions on denigration 
of competitors 
Protection of National 
Treasures/Dissemination of - * Language protection provisions 
Culture 
Pluralism * Justifiable media restrictions * Unjustifiable media restrictions 
* Justifiable sponsorship * Unjustifiable sponsorship 
restrictions restrictions 
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Towards a single 
market in advertising? 
Christophe Pecnard 
Partner 
& 
Dimitri Delesalle 
Solicitor 
Thomas & Associes 
1COM(96) 192 final. 
In November 1992, the Commission took the decision to prepare a Green Paper, with the aim of undertaking a 
'global review of the policy direction to be 
followed in the field of commercial com-
munications' - which, in the terminology 
of the Commission, covers all forms of ad-
vertising, direct marketing, sponsorship, 
sales promotion and public relations 
which are aimed at promoting products 
and services (product packaging is how-
ever excluded). 
As such, commercial communica-
tions play a large economic role in the 
modern economies of the European Un-
ion (EU) , not only in terms of products 
but also in terms of jobs. In fact, they 
generated in 1993 a turnover of ECU 75 
billion and employed some 250,000 peo-
ple. These services, which are an impor-
tant part of the commercial strategy of 
any company or organisation, play a sig-
nificant role in strengthening the single 
market. 
However, numerous studies and 
2s "B 11 , h . surveys had given the Commission the ee: ruxe es s attaque au c antler . . . . 
de la publicite en Europe": Christophe impression that, m the commercial com-
Pecnard - Les Echos, 31 May/1 June munications field the opportunities of the 
1996; "Vers l'instauration d'un . ' . 
marche interieur des communications single market were not bemg fully ex-
commerciales?" by Christophe ploited due to differences in regulations 
Pecnard and Dimitri Delesalle, 
L'observateur de Bruxelles n.18. between the Member States of the EU. 
In adapting, on 8 May, its Green Paper 
3International BMBR Survey for · 1 · t· 1 th C 
the Commission, Commercial Com- on commercia commumca ions e om-
munications, December 1995, n.2. mission wished to identify what it saw as 
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'the actions which needed to be taken in or-
der to create a real single market' in this 
area. The Commission is at the present 
moment undertaking an enormous con-
sultation of all interested parties2. 
The starting point of the review initi-
ated by the Commission is thus the obser-
vation that there exists a patchwork of 
national regulations in the advertising 
field within the EU, from which arise vari-
ous barriers (see I). 
Further, the limits of harmonisation 
by legislation and case law (see II) have 
led the Commission to suggest technical 
solutions to facilitate the establishment of 
a genuine single market for commercial 
communications (see III). 
I. A ~atchwork of national 
regulations 
Nowadays, companies wishing to launch 
cross-border advertising campaigns in the 
EU are confronted by a true patchwork of 
regulations and by restrictions resulting 
from differences between the various ap-
plicable national regulations. 
This situation has been highlighted by 
the results of two surveys conducted on 
behalf of the Commission aimed at finding 
out the opinions of those concerned. 
These surveys show that among the major 
difficulties at cross-border level, all those 
questioned operating in the commercial 
communications area, whether they were 
service providers (for example, advertising 
agencies) , users (advertisers) or media, put 
regulatory difficulties just behind cultural 
barriers. All providers of commercial com-
munication services testified that offering 
effective commercial communication serv-
ices on a large scale costs less in the USA 
than in Europe. 
At present, the very large number of 
cross-border commercial communications 
operations surveyed usually limit them-
selves to a few countries and seldom cover 
the whole of the EU. As a result of regula-
tory differences between the Member 
States, 20% of those companies using some 
commercial communications declared they 
adapted their marketing/advertising strate-
gies to each Member State; 14% decide on 
their marketing strategy centrally but de-
velop it locally, whereas 12% manage their 
commercial communications separately in 
each country3. 
For many small companies, the una-
voidable costs of feasibility studies of le-
gal questions and of adapting their 
campaigns to the requirements of the dif-
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ferent target countries stop all attempts at 
cross-border campaigns. 
The Green Paper points out that, within 
the EU, the actual regulatory environment 
for commercial communications is based 
on different national legal traditions. As a 
consequence, there is a large range of na-
tional measures of differing character and 
severity. Each Member State is aiming to 
achieve a certain number of objectives 
which are sometimes based on approaches 
'which are not totally coherent (or which 
even contradict) those adapted by other 
countries'. 
Such a situation leads inevitably to 
differences between national regulations 
which, according to the Commission, ap-
pear to be greater and greater between 
certain Member States. In this case, as 
soon .as a commercial communications 
service crosses a border, it is confronted 
by a new legal system which can, on oc-
casions, appear quite the opposite to the 
one in its country of origin. 
Any comparison of the main differ-
ences shows how, from one Member State 
to another, measures can range from a to-
tal ban, to limited bans or no bans at all. 
For example, whilst waiting for the 
adoption of the directive allowing com-
parative advertising in the whole of the 
EU, numerous users of commercial com-
munications complained of not being able 
to use comparative advertising in certain 
Member States (such as Germany, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, Italy, Austria), which 
forced them to create completely new 
campaigns for those countries and there-
fore prevented them from creating pan-
european comparative advertisements. 
The regulations relating to price adver-
tising (reductions, slashed prices, etc.) pro-
vide another example of these differences. 
The majority of respondents to the surveys 
believed that the regulatory measures are 
so different that in reality they prevent all 
forms of cross-border campaigns based on 
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this technique. A certain number of spe-
cific examples were quoted, especially the 
very detailed and very different regulations 
on trading stamps and on price reductions 
in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, and 
the effective ban on campaigns like 'three 
for the price of two' in those countries with 
a very low price threshold for free gifts, 
such as Germany and Denmark. 
We can also cite those measures relat-
ing to 'intrusive advertising' (tele-market-
ing, mailshots). The regulations relating 
to unsolicited tele-marketing vary in in-
tensity from a lack of measures (Spain) to 
a total ban (for example, in Germany tele-
marketing is not allowed even if people 
are previously given notice in writing), to 
limited bans (for example, in Denmark 
this form of direct selling is only allowed 
for books, subscriptions to newspapers or 
magazines and insurance policies; result-
ing orders are however not legally re-
stricted). As far as direct advertising by 
mailshot is concerned, it seems that the 
Netherlands (with a self-disciplinary 
code) and Italy impose the most 
restrictive measures. According to re-
spondents, such differences represent 
obstacles to the efficiency of cross-border 
direct marketing services. 
The example of advertising aimed at 
children also illustrates the regulatory dif-
ferences between different Member States 
of the EU and the consequent difficulties . 
Two Member States stand out in particu-
lar with regard to the restrictiveness of 
their legislation relating to advertising 
aimed at children. Even though Sweden 
traditionally has a legal system opposed 
to censorship, it forbids TV commercials 
which target children under 12. Further-
more, all individuals playing an important 
role in TV programmes which target 
mainly children under 12 are not allowed 
to take part in commercials. Finally, it is 
forbidden to have any commercials dur-
ing advertisement breaks preceding or 
From one Member 
State to another, 
measures can 
range from a total 
ban, to limited bans 
or no bans at all 
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Legal changes are 
so numerous, it 
is very difficult for 
business to know 
precisely all 
relevant national 
legislation. 
4JOCE n. L40 of 11 February 1989 
5JOCE n. LI l of 14 January 1994 
6JOCE n. 303 of 15 December 1995 
7JOCE n. L341 of 30 December 1994 
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immediately following a programme tar-
geting mainly children under 12. As far as 
Greece is concerned, it forbids TV com-
mercials for toys between 7am and 10pm. 
The Green Paper provides numerous 
examples of regulatory differences, and it 
is noticeable that they nowadays cover 
most of the commercial communication 
sectors and affect all advertisers, service 
providers and media active in this area. 
Moreover, this situation is constantly 
evolving. In the area of commercial com-
munications, legal changes are so numer-
ous, it is very difficult for business to know 
precisely all relevant national legislation. 
This shows how hard it is for companies 
trying to carry out any comparative survey. 
The Commission considers that such 
regulatory differences will become even 
greater as the Information Society devel-
ops, bringing with it new forms of com-
mercial communications and increased 
cross-border commercial communications. 
Faced with such a situation, the EU 
seems to have a major role to play in lim-
iting these differences and offering busi-
ness greater legal certainty in decision 
making. The second survey showed that 
51 % of companies questioned which had 
used commercial communications fa -
voured an approach based on a minimum 
common regulatory standard. 8% fa -
voured pan-European regulations. Self-
regulation was spontaneously mentioned 
by advertisers (although only 3% of 
companies questioned thought that the 
Commission should trust 'effective self-
regulation'). 
However, if certain tools exist which 
would allow such harmonisation at the 
European level, the study shows the lim-
its that still remain. 
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II. The current tools of harmonisa-
tion and the limits 
Confronted with this regulatory patch-
work, the Community authorities are try-
ing to harmonise, at the EU level, the 
rules applying to commercial communi-
cations. 
This harmonisation is not only being 
driven by the Community legislator, by 
adopting texts of Community secondary 
legislation (A), but also by the European 
Court, on the basis of the principles of 
free trade and of the free provision of 
services (B).The study of this harmonisa-
tion shows that there is still a lot to be 
done and that barriers remain numerous. 
A. Harmonisation by 
secondary legislation 
In aiming at establishing a commercial com-
munication Internal Market, the Community 
legislator has already harmonised or is try-
ing to harmonise a certain number of rules. 
Two major types of regulations can 
be identified: horizontal regulations (1), 
and vertical regulations (2). 
1. Horizontal regulations 
These are regulations relating to advertis-
ing in general - to the tools and tech-
niques used in advertising - and are not 
linked to a specific product or service. 
• Even though it is not directly linked to 
advertising, we can first of all look at the 
Community legislation on brands which 
can play a major role in cross-border ad-
vertising campaigns. National brand regu-
lations have been harmonised by the 
Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 De-
cember 1988 which brought closer to-
gether the legislation of the Member 
States on bra:nds4. The Regulation (EC) n. 
40/94 dated 20 December 19935 and its 
applying Regulation (EC) n.2868/95 dated 
13 December 19956 have put in place the 
'Community brand'. It is also important to 
mention Council Regulation (EC) n. 3295/ 
94 of 22 December 1994 determining the 
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measures banning the widespread prac-
tice, export, re-export as well as the plac-
ing under injunction of counterfeited and 
pirated goods.7 
More directly linked to advertising are 
the following directives: 
• Council Directive 84/ 450/ EEC of 10 
September 1984 relating to the harmoni-
sation of legal, regulatory and administra-
tive measures of the Member States 
against misleading advertising8 . This Di-
rective aims to harmonise national meas-
ures to protect consumers and people in 
a commercial, industrial, craft or profes-
sional activity, as well as the general pub-
lic interest against misleading advertising 
and its unfair consequences . This text 
puts in place a minimum standard for 
misleading advertising and requires the 
establishment in each Member State of a 
watchdog. The text gives the Member 
States the option to adopt stricter meas-
ures, i.e. increased protection against mis-
leading advertising9. 
In 1991, the Commission proposed a 
Directive to the European Parliament and 
the Council concerning comparative ad-
vertising which modified the Directive 84/ 
450/ EEC on misleading advertising10 , a 
\, proposition which was modified in 199411 . 
-\This text aims at allowing, in certain con-
ditions (Art. 3, and following), compara-
tive advertising at the Community level, 
and at harmonising the application in view 
of tile establishment of the Internal Market 
as well as the need to improve consumers' 
information and stimulate competition. 
Given the comprehensive scope of the 
harmonisation envisaged, the Member 
States would not in principle be allowed, 
in the area of comparative advertising, to 
maintain or adopt more restrictive meas-
ures. In its current form the proposition 
would , for example, oblige France to 
amend its current legislation, in particular 
by repealing measures requiring the prior 
notification of the competitor targeted by 
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the comparison. 
The EU Council, which had reached 
a political agreement on the text in No-
vember 1995 , adopted a common posi-
tion on 19 March 1996. This text will now 
be subject to a second reading by the 
European Parliament, within the frame-
work of the codecision procedure. 
• The 'TVWF - television without frontiers' 
Council Directive 89/ 552/ EEC of 3 Octo-
ber 1989, on the coordination of certain 
legislative, regulatory and administrative 
measures of Member States relating to the 
provision of televisual broadcast activi-
ties12. This Directive aims to ensure 'the 
passage from national markets to a com-
mon market/or the production and distri-
bution of programmes and the creation of 
the conditions for/air competition .' 
The Directive contains measures on 
television advertising and sponsorship 
(Chapter IV). Certain measures deal in 
particular with advertising for certain 
products (tobacco , alcohol, medicines 
and medical treatments) or the protection 
of minors (Article 16). 
For the time being, each Member State 
has to apply to those broadcasters under 
its jurisdiction the rules of the Directive, 
notably those concerning advertising (Ar-
ticle 3, para. 2; 'the principle of country of 
origin control') , though they remain free to 
impose on broadcasters under their juris-
diction stricter or more detailed rules, in 
those areas targeted by the Directive. The 
other Member States are obliged to accept 
the reception on their territory of broad-
casts and are not allowed to block their re-
transmission by cable or sate llite for 
reasons relating to an area covered by the 
Directive, such as advertising (Article 2, 
para . 2). They can, however, suspend, 
temporarily and under the control of the 
Commission, the re-transmission of broad-
casts originating from other Member 
States, if the protection of their minors is 
compromised. 
8JOCE n.L250 of 19 September 
1984 
9Henry Lesguillons "Publicite et 
marche commun", RDAI special n. 
1986 "La publicite et !'Europe", 
p.39 
10JOCE n. C 180 of 11 July 1991 
11JOCE n. C 136 of 19 May 1994 
12 JOCE n. L298 of 17 October 1989 
13JOCE n. C 185 of 19 July 1995 
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It is true that this 
Directive requires 
Member States to 
ban misleading 
advertising, but it 
does not specify 
when advertising 
is misleading. 
14Ruling n. 94-542 of 28 June 1994, 
JORF 30 June 1994; decree n. 95-
438 of 14April 1995, JORF23April 
1995 
15Peter Schotthofer "Regulation of 
Marketing in Europe" : Commercial 
Communications , December 1995 , 
p.3 
16Council Directive proposal about 
consumers' protection in the area of 
long-distance negotiation of con-
tracts (JOCE n. C 156 of 23 June 
1992) 
17European Parliament and Council 
Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 
1995, relating to the protection of 
individuals concerning personal data 
protection and the free circulation of 
those data (JOCE n. L28 l of 23 No-
vember 1995) 
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The text of the Directive provided for 
a review of its measures five years after 
their application: the Commission thus 
presented in 1995 a first draft proposal 
modifying Directive 89/ 552/ EEC 13 . The 
stakes of this revision are considerable and 
of course go beyond issues relating to ad-
vertising. On 14 February 1996, the Euro-
pean Parliament, during its first reading of 
the Commission proposal, put forward 
highly significant amendments to the text. 
It wished, for example, to reinforce the re-
quirement that a majority of programmes 
be European in origin (broadcast quotas) , 
to include new audio visual services (e.g. 
video on demand) within the scope of the 
Directive, and to modify the criteria used 
to define the competent Member State 
(an extension of the country of destination 
criterion). 
Following these amendments , the 
Commission proposed on 7 May a new 
draft, without, however, including the im-
portant amendments relating to new serv-
ices, nor those relating to the strengthening 
of quotas. As far as the criteria defining the 
competent Member State were concerned, 
the Commission considered that it was im-
portant to maintain the principle of country 
of origin, whilst at the same time setting out 
several criteria to fall within the compe-
tence of Member States. 
The Council, which had already 
reached in November 1995 a political 
agreement not to alter the more contro-
versial elements of the 1989 text (espe-
cially those dealing with quotas), reached 
a new agreement on 11 June, notably by 
deciding to keep the status quo on quo-
tas, by following the Commission line on 
the competence of the country of origin, 
and by excluding new services from the 
scope of the Directive. The Parliament 
now has three months to complete its sec-
ond reading of the text. 
Besides this TVWF Directive, there 
also exists, at the level of the Council of 
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Europe, the 'European convention on 
cross-border television ', signed in Stras-
bourg on 5 May 1989. This convention, 
which came into force in France in 199514, 
also includes a certain number of meas-
ures dealing with advertising (Chapter III) 
and sponsorship (Chapter IV). The frame-
work put in place by this convention is 
very similar to that of the TVWF Directive. 
These two Directives, directly dealing 
with advertising, mark the beginning of 
the creation of a common framework. 
Nonetheless, the Directive on misleading 
advertising is proving to be a failure 15 . It 
is true that this Directive requires Member 
States to ban misleading advertising, but 
it does not specify when advertising is 
misleading. Differences in interpretation 
between Member States can, therefore , 
once again, complicate the launch of a 
cross-border advertising campaign. 
• Finally, the Commission proposed in 
1992 a draft Directive dealing with the 
long-distance negotiation of contracts16, 
which aims to harmonise consumer pro-
tection measures in order to allow the de-
velopment of cross-border long-distance 
selling techniques. This draft nevertheless 
allows Member States to apply stricter 
measures in the interest of consumer pro-
tection. On 27 February 1996, the Council/ 
judging unacceptable the amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament to 
its common position on 13 December dur-
ing its second reading, decided to call on 
the conciliation committee, under article 
189 B of the European Union Treaty, in the 
framework of the codecision procedure. 
Lastly, one has to mention the recent 
Directive on personal data17 , which will 
allow the free circulation of such data, es-
sential for the effective functioning of a 
European direct marketing sector, on the 
basis of a common set of rules protecting 
the private lives of individuals. 
2. Vertical regulations 
These regulations deal with specific prod-
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ucts or services. Amongst these are: 
• Council Directive 92/ 28/EEC of 31 
March 1992, relating to the advertising of 
medicines for human use18, harmonises 
this sector by banning the advertising of 
prescription pharmaceutical products, 
and for those containing tranquillizers or 
narcotics. Member States are allowed to 
ban all advertising of pharmaceutical 
products eligible for refunds by social se-
curity bodies. The advertising of 'over 
the counter' pharmaceutical products is 
restricted to those products which have 
been authorised to be placed on the mar-
ket. The advertising of prescription phar-
maceutical products is restricted to media 
aimed at the medical profession, whilst 
'over the counter pharmaceutical prod-
ucts' can be advertised in all media, but 
subject to strict conditions. 
Article 14 of the TVWF Directive pro-
vides for common rules in all Member 
States in the field of television advertising 
of pharmaceutical products. 
• In the field of advertising of food prod-
ucts, there is Council Directive 79/ 112/ 
EEC of 18 December 1978, concerning 
the harmonisation of Member State legis-
lation dealing with the labelling and pres-
entation of food products aimed at the 
consumer, as well as their advertising19 . 
However, the scope for harmonisation is 
limited, since Article 15 of this directive 
states' that its provisions only apply to na-
tional measures dealing with labelling 
and presentation, and not, despite its ti-
tle, to measures regulating commercial 
communications. 
Directive 91/ 321/ EEC of 14 May 1991 
relating to baby food, lays down the mini-
mum standards to be adopted by Member 
States in order to regulate the advertising 
of this type of product20 . 
As for the TVWF Directive, Article 15 
harmonised the rules relating to the ad-
vertising of alcoholic drinks. 
• The Commission has proposed a draft 
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Council Directive relating to the harmoni-
sation of legislative, regulatory and ad-
ministrative measures of Member States 
concerned with the advertising of to-
bacco products21 . The Commission put 
forward a modified draft on 30 April 
199222 . This text aims to ban all direct and 
indirect tobacco advertising. However, 
several Member States (including Ger-
many, Denmark, Greece, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands) have been 18JOCE n. Lll3 of 30 April 1992 
blocking for several years the adoption of 19JOCE n. L33 of 8 February 1979, 
a common position by the Council. modified several times. 
• There are also measures relating to ad- 2omcE n. L175 of 4 July 1991 
vertising to be found in the Directives 21 JOCE n. Cl67 of27 June 1991 dealing with the provision of financial 
and insurance services23• Very recently, 22JOCE n. c129 of21 May 1992 
the Commission has adopted a Green 23Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 
Paper24, which aims to identify the needs 20 December 1985, relating to cer-
and concerns of consumers in the field of tain under_takings for collectiv~ !n-
vestment in transferable secunt1es 
financial services (banking, insurance, (UCITS) (JOCE n. L375 of 31 De-
dealing in securities) especially when cember 1985); second Council Di-
h · ld' d' rective 89/646/EEC of 15 December t ose services are so at a 1stance. 1989 concerning access to credit in-
Despite the adoption of these EU texts stitutions and its practice (JOCE n. 
L386 of 30 December 1989); Coun-
aimed at harmonisation, the commercial cil Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 
communication sector is still a long way 1993 concerning investment serv-
from a single market. In fact, most of these ices in securities (JOCE n. L141 of 
11 June 1993). In insurance, Coun-
measures are disconnected, harmonising cil Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 
only certain areas of commercial commu- 1992 relating to direct insurance 
except life insurance (third directive 
nications. Moreover, for the most part, they 'non- life insurance') (JOCE n. L228 
only lay down minimum rules, thus leav- of 11 August 1992) and Council Di-
rective 92/96/EEC of I O November 
ing to Member States the scope to adopt 1992 relating to direct life insurance 
stricter measures (e.g. the 1984 Directive (third directive 'life insurance') 
(JOCE n. L360 of 9 Dcember 1992). 
on misleading advertising). 
Up until now, given the absence of 24Green Paper 'Services financiers: 
1 · · ( b · l h repondre aux attentes des 1armornsat1on or at est mcomp ete ar- consommateurs, (COM(96)209). 
monisation), it has been the European 
Court of Justice which has played a lead-
ing role in the progressive creation of a 
common framework in the area of com-
mercial communications. 
B. Harmonisation by case law 
The principle of the free circulation of 
goods has been, at least until 1993, the one 
used in case law to combat barriers to the 
establishment of a single market in the 
advertising sector. The limits of this line of 
27 
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25ECJ "Keck & Mithouard" of 24 
November 1993, Case C-267 and C-
268/91, Volume 1993 p. 6097 
26ECJ " Dassonville" of l l July 
1974, Case 8/74, Volume 1974, 
p.837. 
27ECJ "Rewe Zentral" (i .e. "Cassis 
de Dijon") of 20 February 1979, 
Case 120/78, Volume 1979 p.649; 
for comment on this case, see A. 
Mattera "L' article 30 du Traite 
CEE, la jurisprudence "Cassis de 
Dijon" et le principe de reconnais-
sance mutuelle" Revue du Marche 
Unique Europeen, 4/1992 p.13). 
28see especially ECJ "Oosthock's 
Uitgeversmaatschappij B. V." of 15 
December 1982, Case 286/81, Vol-
ume 1982 p. 4575 ; ECJC "Suet" of 
16 May 1989, Case 382/87, Volume 
1989 p.1235; ECJC "GB -!NNO-
BM'' of 7 March 1990, Volume 1990 
p.667; ECJ "Aragonesa de 
Publicitad Exterior et Publivia" of 
25 July 1991, Volume 1991 p.4151; 
ECJ"Yves Rocher" of 18 May 1993, 
Volume 1993 p. 2361. 
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approach, exposed by the recent develop-
ment of the Court's case law, could give a 
renewed impetus to the principle of the 
free provision of services, undoubtedly a 
tool better adapted to tackle existing bar-
riers in the field of advertising. Such at least 
is one of the messages that the Green Pa-
per tries to put across. 
1. The free circulation of goods 
Up until the 'Keck and Mithouard' judge-
ment of 24 November 199Y5, the case law 
of the European Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (ECJ), in the field 
of the free circulation of goods (Articles 
30 and following in the EC Treaty), played 
a leading role in the progressive creation 
of a common framework for advertising 
and sales promotion. 
Article 30 of the EC Treaty, in fact, 
bans quantitative restrictions on imports 
as well as all 'measures with an equiva-
lent effect'. Since the 'Dassonville' judge-
ment of 11 July 197426 , the EC] has, on 
various occasions, pronounced that na-
tional discriminatory measures, but also 
equally non-discriminatory measures (i.e. 
those applied equally to national and to 
imported products), could constitute a 
measure equivalent to a quantitative re-
striction, if such measures 'were capable 
of hindering) directly or indirectly) actu-
ally or potentially) intra -Community 
trade ) 27 . 
In this way, the EC], recognising the 
existence of an indirect economic link be-
tween commercial communication serv-
ices and the sale of goods, came to 
examine, in the name of the free circula-
tion of goods (Articles 30 and following 
of the EC Treaty), non-discriminatory 
national measures which limited or 
banned certain forms of advertising or 
certain types of sales promotion. 
The ECJ in fact consistently took the 
view in its case law28 that national legisla-
tion which restricts or bans certain forms 
of advertising or certain means of sales 
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promotion may, 'although it does not di-
rectly affect imports, be such as to restrict 
their volume because it affects marketing 
opportunities for the imported products. 
The possibility cannot be ruled out that to 
compel a producer either to adopt advertis-
ing or sales promotion schemes which dif-
fer from one Member State to another or to 
discontinue a scheme which he considers 
to be particularly effective may constitute 
an obstacle to imports even if the legislation 
in question applies to domestic and im-
ported products without distinction.' 
The restriction or banning of advertis-
ing could thus constitute a measure hav-
ing equivalent effect in the sense of 
Article 30 of the Treaty, since it could re-
strict the importation of products from a 
Member State. 
The national measure in question 
could only escape being classified as a 
'measure having equivalent effect' if it 
met an overriding objective (e.g. the 
protection of consumers, or fair dealing 
in commercial transactions). Even then it 
was necessary to establish whether the 
measure was appropriate to the objec-
tive specified. This involved assessing 
whether the measure could achieve its 
objective and, also, checking the meas--
ure did not go beyond what was needed 
to achieve it. In other words, it was nec-
essary to assess whether less restrictive 
measures could not achieve the same re-
sult ('the proportionality criteria'). 
If it failed to meet an overriding objec-
tive and was not proportionate, the na-
tional measure in question could escape 
prohibition under Article 30, if it could be 
justified under one of the narrow criteria 
listed in Article 36 of the Treaty (e.g. pub-
lic morality or health grounds) and was 
proportionate to the end sought. 
If this was not the case, the national 
legislator could, at the request of the Court, 
be forced to overturn the measure, at least 
to the extent to which it applied to the 
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nationals of other Member States. As far as 
its own nationals are concerned, the na-
tional legislator would retain all its pow-
ers29, and would thus continue to submit 
them to the measure in question, even 
though this could lead to 'reverse discrimi-
nation'. 
Thus, even though the process could 
be a long one, the ECJ contributed in its 
own way to the harmonisation of rules 
relating to advertising and sales promo-
tion. This case law based on Article 30 
constituted progress towards 'Euro mar-
keting'30 . Within the framework defined 
by the case law, firms could adhere to 
regulations applying to its advertising 
campaign in its home Member State, and 
pursue the same advertising campaign in 
neighbouring countries, even if these had 
stricter rules in force. 
Nonetheless, in November 1993 the 
Court thought it necessary to restate its 
jurisprudence. It had noted that busi-
nesses were increasingly invoking Article 
30 of the Treaty to challenge all sorts of 
measures they judged as limiting their 
commercial freedom, even if these meas-
ures did not target products from other 
Member States. 
In ruling on the compatibility of 
French regulations banning the sale of 
goods at a loss with Article 30 of the EC 
Treaty (ECJ: 'Keck and Mithouard' of 24 
November 199331) , the Court introduced 
a distinction ( criticised by some commen-
tators32) between two categories of na-
tional measures. On the one hand were 
those measures which applied directly to 
goods themselves, and which remained 
subject to the principle of the free trade in 
goods; on the other, were those measures 
which limited or banned what the ruling 
called 'certain sales methods' and which 
were, in principle, excluded. 
Indeed, according to the Cornt, ' in the 
absence of harmonisation legislation, 
measures of equivalent effect prohibited by 
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Article 30 include obstacles to the free 
movement c?f goods where they are the con-
sequence qf applying rules that lay down 
requirements to be met by such goods (such 
as requirements as to the designation, 
form, size, weight, composition, presenta-
tion, labelling, packaging) to goods from 
other Member States where they are law-
fully manufactured and marketed, even if 
those rules apply without distinction to all 
products unless their application can be 
justified by a public interest o~jective tak-
ing precedence over the free movement qf 
goods ' (paragraph 15) . 
On the other hand, 'the application to 
products from other Member States of na-
tional provisions restricting or prohibiting 
certain selling arrangements is not such as 
to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, trade between Member States 
within the meaning of the Dassonville 
judgement provided that those provisions 
apply to all affected traders operating 
within the national territory and provided 29ECJ "Driancourt/Cognet" of 23 
October 1986, Case 355/85 , Volume 
that they affect in the same manner, in law 1986 p.3238 . 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic 
· ,f' h fi b 30Harry Duintjer Tebbens " Les products and OJ t ose rom other Mem er conj1its de lois en matiere de 
States. ' (paragraph 16). publicite deloyate a L'epreuve du 
Thus as a generalisation national droit com:'1-~nautaire" Rev.Crit. Dr. 
' ' Intern. Pnve, July/September 1994, 
measures which are indiscriminately ap- p.451 
Plied to both national and imported prod- 31see note 25 
ucts, and which restrict commercial activity 
(who can sell products, how, where and 32see for example A. Mattera, "De 
l 'arret "Dassonville" a l'arret 
when), are in principle now exempt - pro-
viding, as the Court emphasised, that these 
measures are truly non-discriminatory in 
the way they are actually applied by Mem-
ber States. 
Turning in particular to restrictions 
imposed by national legislation in the 
field of advertising, these now appear as 
if they could be considered exempt for 
the most part, on the grounds that they 
fall under the area of sales methods, 
which can no longer be tested against 
Article 30. Thus the Court has ruled as 
sales methods national regulations ban-
"Keck ": !'obscure clarte d'une ju-
risprudence riche en principes 
novateurs et en contradictions ", 
Revue du Marche Unique Europeen, 
I /1994 p. I 17. 
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33ECJ ' Ruth Hiinermund e.a. cl 
Landesapothekerkammer Baden -
Wiirttemberg' of 15 December 
1993 , Case 292/92, Volume 1993 
p.6787; ECJ 'Societe d 'importation 
Leclerc-Siplec c/TF 1 Publicite SA 
et M6 Publicite' of9 February 1995, 
Case 4 12/93 , Volume 1995 p.179 
34Christophe Pecnard and Christophe 
Henin 'Keck et Mithouard, deux ans 
apres: le nouvel emballage de la 
Libre circulation des marchandises', 
RDAI n.3 1996. 
35ECJ 'Mars' of 6 July 1995, Case 
470/93, Volume 1995 p.1923; ECJ 
' Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb cl 
Cliniques Laboratoires e.a.' of 2 
February 1994, case 315/92, Volume 
1994 p.342. In those two rulings , the 
Court has allowed compan ies to use 
the same packaging for the distri-
bution of their products in the whole 
of the EU, and in a more global way, 
uniform packaging, with uniform 
presentation and identical labelli ng. 
36ECJ ' Procureur du Roi clMarc 
JVC Debauve et autres' of 18 March 
1980, Case 52/79, Vo lume 1980 
p.833 
37see note 30 
38ECJ 'Bond van Adverteerders cl 
£tat neerlandais' of 26 April 1988, 
Case 352/85 , Volume 1988 p.2085 
39ECJ of 25 July 1991 ' Saeger! 
Dennemeyer' , Case 76/90, Volume 
199 1 p 4221 ; 'Gouda' , Case 288/ 
89; Volume 1991 p.4007 ; 'Commis-
sion cl Pays-Bas' , Case 353/89, Vol-
ume 1991 p.4069. 
40ECJ 'Rewe 'Zentral' , of 20 February 
J 979, Case 120/78, Volume 1979, 
p.649. 
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ning the advertising of certain economic 
activities or sectors 3·3. 
One nonetheless has to be cautious 
since sometimes certain national meas-
ures relating to advertising do not benefit 
from the 'immunity' associated with the 
notion of sales methods. In fact, when 
these measures cause an 'extrinsic ma-
nipulation'34 of the product (changes to 
the packaging, presentation, labelling, 
packing), they are subject all the same to 
Article 30. For example, national meas-
ures which relate to advertising on the 
packaging of products being promoted 
are open to coming under the notion of 
sales methods 35. 
Thus , even if certain regulations con-
cerning advertising continue to be exam-
ined under Article 30, a large number of 
them have been exempted by the Keck 
ruling from the scope of the principle of 
the free trade in goods. The Court has 
abandoned the previous leading role it 
played in the area of 'harmonising' the 
rules relating to advertising. 
2. The free provision of services 
As the Commission has emphasised in its 
Green Paper, commercial communica-
tions without doubt come under internal 
market law and, in particular, under those 
provisions relating to the freedom to pro-
vide services (Articles 59 and following of 
the EC Treaty). 
Indeed, commercial communication 
activities involve the provision of various 
different services by different service pro-
viders (e.g. advertising agencies) . The 
Court has already had the opportunity to 
confirm on several occasions that adver-
tising constitutes a service36 . As soon as 
this service is of a "cross-border" nature, 
and is provided against remuneration, 
then it benefits fully from the provisions 
of the chapter on the freedom to provide 
services . 
This principle of freedom to provide 
services guarantees that a Member State 
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cannot restrict the services coming from 
another Member State, except when these 
restrictions respond to particular condi-
tions. Failing that , only the law of the 
Member State, where the provider is 
based, applies (Country of Origin princi-
ple). 
As the Court's case law has evolved, 
the scope of the principle of the freedom 
to provide services has grown wider37. In 
the beginning, this principle was simply in-
te rp rete d as a ban on discrimination 
against service providers originating from 
other Member States. It now covers all pos-
sible permutations, where either the pro-
vider, the recipient, or just the service itself 
crosses an intra-Community border38 . 
The Court, with the evolution of its 
case law, has also sanctioned an exten-
sion of Article 59 to non-discriminatory 
national measures (applied indiscrimi-
nately) . This evolution of Article 59, from 
a ban on discrimination to a rule which 
also targeted non-discriminatory restric-
tions , has emerged since 1981 through a 
series of rulings. With three important 
rulings on 25 July 1991 39 , the Court of 
Justice fully applied in the field of the 
free provision of services, similar case 
law principles to those which have been 
applied since the 'Cassis de Dijon' rul-
ing4o . 
Discriminatory measures are only 
compatible with Community law if they 
come under an explicit exemption, such 
as Article 56 of the Treaty (public order, 
health and security), which cannot be 
used to justify economic objectives. 
Moreover, these measures have to respect 
the principle of proportionality. 
However, Article 59 is not limited to 
restricting national discriminatory meas-
ures. In fact, as the Court emphasised, in 
the absence of any harmonisation of meas-
ures relating to services , or something 
similar, obstacles to the free provision of 
services can arise from the application of 
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national regulations, even if they affect all 
those within a national territory, to service 
providers based on the territory of another 
Member State, who already have to satisfy 
the regulatory requirements of that Mem-
ber State. Such indiscriminately applied 
national measures are thus open to being 
examined under the scope of Article 59. 
However, these measures can be de-
clared compatible with Article 59 if they 
can be justified by 'urgent public interest 
needs', equivalent to the urgent need ex-
emption in the context of the free trade of 
goods41. It is the Court which has progres-
sively in its case law drawn up a non-ex-
haustive list of these 'urgent public 
interest needs' . Amongst these, for in-
stance, are the protection of pluralism, of 
consumers, and language policy. 
The measure concerned, though , 
must not impose requirements which the 
service provider has already met by re-
specting the rules imposed in his country 
of origin (mutual recognition). 
In addition, the regulation must be 
proportionate to the stated objectives. 
An important issue currently presents 
itself: whether the principles put forward 
by the case law Keck & Mithouard (see 
above) be extended to the free provision 
of services . For certain authors42, by its 
decision 'Alpine Investments BV' of 10 
May 1995 (Case 384/ 93, Volume 1995, p. 
1141), the Court extended, implicitly but 
without question, the Keck case law to 
the free provision of services. For others43 , 
on the other hand, the Court condemned 
all attempts to extend the Keck case law. 
The Commission is very cautious. In its 
Green Pa per, the Commission seems to 
consider that up until now the Court has 
not applied this case law to the free pro-
vision of services but that it 'is not ex-
cluded that the Commission extends to 
Article 59 the same logic it held during the 
Keck case'. It added 'for the time being, it 
is impossible to say in general terms what 
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the exact consequences of this extension 
would be: in fact, it would depend very 
much on the type of services '. 
Moreover, it has to be said that a sim-
ple transposition of the concepts elabo-
rated by the Court in the Keck and 
Mithouard ruling to help bring the princi-
ple contained in Article 59 into operation 
is not very easy to conceive in practice. 
In any event, Articles 59 and follow-
ing of the Treaty can make an important 
contribution to the progressive creation 
of a common framework for commercial 
Ifwe analyse the rulings of the Court, it is 
essentially on the basis of Article 30, relating 
to the free circulation of goods, that national 
legislation on commercial communications 
has been tackled The Keck ruling has put a 
brake on such an approach 
communications. However, as the Com-
mission already pointed out in 1985 in its 
White Paper on the completion of the 
Internal Market, 'progress in the area of 
the free provision of services from one 
Member State to the other have been much 
slower than that made in the area the free 
circulation of goods' because 'companies 
and individuals have not yet succeeded in 
taking full advantage of these opportuni-
ties '. 
If we analyse the rulings of the Court, 
it is essentially on the basis of Article 30 
(and following), relating to the free circu-
lation of goods that national legislation 
on commercial communications has been 
tackled44• The Keck ruling has put a brake 
on such an approach. 
However, commercial communica-
tions must not only be seen as 'simple 
methods of selling', but also as real services 
in their own right. Companies and indi-
viduals have at their disposal Article 59, 
which could be an efficient tool for harmo-
41 see J.G. Huglo's comments in the 
Gazette du Palais, 10 - 12 Decem-
ber 1995, p.18. 
42Daniel Fasquelle's comments, Bul-
letin Joly, Market exchange and fi-
nancial products, July-August 1995, 
p.297. 
43Laurence Tdot 's comments, Revue 
Europe, July 1995, n.264. 
44lt is allowed to question oneself on 
the position that the Commission 
would have had if the "Leclerc-
Siplec vs TFl Publicite and M6 
Publicite" appeal on the compatibil-
ity of the ban in France for the dis-
tribution of advertising on television 
(see note 33) had been based on Ar-
ticle 59 instead of Article 30. 
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The Commission 
has concentrated 
on the importance 
of the principle of 
the free provision 
of services. 
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nising the rules for commercial communi-
cations if it were more often used. Such is 
one of the messages that the Commission 
is trying to get through to advertising pro-
fessionals with its Green Paper. 
Ill. The new prospects opened 
up by the Green Paper 
Faced with EU secondary legislation in this 
still fragmented sector and the Court of 
Justice tendency to categorise, in most of 
its rulings, advertising as a 'sales method' 
incapable of affecting the free circulation 
of goods, the Commission has concen-
trated on the importance of the principle 
of the free provision of services. 
In fact, as has already been pointed 
out, commercial communication services 
come under Internal Market legislation 
and, especially, under the measures on 
the free provision of services (Articles 59 
and following of the EU Treaty). Unfortu-
nately, the Commission surveys have 
showed that the opportunities the Inter-
nal Market offers to all those concerned 
with commercial communications could 
not always be fully exploited because of 
different regulations between Member 
States. 
However, the creation of a real Inter-
nal Market in this field would allow the 
providers of commercial communication 
services (e .g. advertising agencies) to ex-
tend their activities beyond national bor-
ders. The users (advertisers) could then 
benefit from the efficiency gains realised 
and get a better quality service at a more 
moderate price. Moreover, they could re-
duce their costs on three other expendi-
ture items (legal research, marketing, 
distribution). The media would benefit as 
well by being able to increase advertising 
revenues. Finally, consumers could ben-
efit, in a less fragmented market, from a 
greater choice of products and services 
and more competitive prices. 
In order to achieve this , the Commis-
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sion has thought it necessary to analyse in 
detail the potential regulatory barriers to 
the establishment of this market. Accord-
ing to the preliminary study, the Green 
Paper highlights three categories of po-
tential barriers to cross-border commer-
cial communication services: 
• regulatory bans: certain Member States 
forbid some types or contents of specific 
commercial communications which are 
allowed in other Member States (e .g. 
measures forbidding use of foreign lan-
guages, regulations forbidding use of cer-
tain media by specific categories of 
advertisers). 
• horizontal regulatory limitations: cer-
tain Member States have decided to im-
pose strict limits to certain general forms 
of commercial communications (e.g . 
regulations limiting advertising targeting 
children or those limiting the possibilities 
of buying cross-border spaces). 
• specific regulatory limitations: certain 
member States impose strict limits on 
commercial communications relating to 
certain sectors or products/ services (e.g. 
regulations limiting advertising of alco-
holic drinks, regulations limiting advertis-
ing for certain professions). 
The preliminary analysis of the regula-
tions show that, in practice, the potential 
obstacles to the establishment of the Inter-
nal Market are caused by existing non-dis-
c rimina to ry measures, and not by 
discriminatory measures based on nation-
ality. Insofar as those measures create ob-
stacles to the exchange of commercial 
communication services between Member 
States, their compatibility with Internal 
Market legislation, and especially with the 
fundamental principle of the free provision 
of services, depends essentially on the 
definition of the objectives to be met by 
those measures and on the proportional-
ity of the presumed restrictions. As noted 
by the Commission, given that the safe-
guard of public interest objectives ('urgent 
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public interest needs', e.g. consumers' pro-
tection, public health protection) repre-
sents the principal goal of these measures, 
it is the proportionality of the measures 
which needs to be examined. 
According to the case law of the EU 
Court of Justice, the proportionality crite-
rion requires, first of all, verification of the 
appropriate nature of the national restric-
tive measure, given the objective sought 
and, secondly, verification that the na-
tional restrictive measure does not go be-
yond what is necessary to the achievement 
of this objective. 
Until now, the Court's case law has 
not provided precise tools for assessing 
the proportionality of national measures. 
It is because of this that the Commission 
suggests in its Green Paper a methodol-
ogy for improving the assessment of the 
proportionality of those national meas-
ures which could cause problems at the 
community level. The Commission also 
intends to apply this methodology to its 
own proposals so that they are consistent 
with other policies and proportional to 
the problems to be solved. 
Based on the Court's case law and on 
a reliable economic analysis of the func-
tioning of commercial communications, 
this methodology provides for a case by 
case assessment rather than for an auto-
matic and compulsory system of assess-
ment. The examination of the national 
measure would comprise two steps: 
1. The first consists of identifying the 
principal features of the measure in the 
light of five predetermined assessment 
criteria so as to give an overall view of its 
effects on the market, and especially on 
the activities it seeks to regulate. 
The first assessment criterion consists 
in determining the potential 'chain reac-
tion' that the measure (A) can set off. This 
is essentially an analysis of the 
potential reactions of the market to a 
measure. In the area of commercial corn-
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munications, the relevant market forces 
are concentrated on three interrelated 
groups of economic operators (users, 
providers and media). Together, they rep-
resent what the Commission calls the 
'commercial communications chain'. 
Each group will intervene either directly 
or indirectly in all commercial communica-
tion activities. The assessment must there-
fore cover systematically the relationships 
between these groups. Assessment of the 
reaction along this chain (the 'chain reac-
tion') consists of two parts: first, identifica-
tion of the key group that the measure 
targets and, secondly, identification of the 
most likely reactions, within the commercial 
communication chain, towards an existing 
or proposed measure. 
The second assessment criterion con-
sists in examining the objectives of the 
measure (B). This requires defining its main 
objective while also taking into account all 
other objectives indirectly implied by it. 
The third assessment criterion consists 
in checking whether the measure is relevant 
to the objective sought (C). The features, 
definitions, distinctions, criteria, etc. used to 
determine the content of the proposed 
measure must be relevant to its objective. 
The fourth criterion entails checking 
whether the measure has an effect on ob-
jectives other than those sought (D). The 
proposed measure might in fact conflict 
with some other objective being pursued 
in the public interest or with some other 
EU objective. 
Finally, the fifth criterion seeks to check 
the efficiency of the measure (E). It checks 
whether the specific character of the meas-
ure and the degree of restriction it imposes 
will enable the objective to be fulfilled. 
2. The second step takes the main features 
of the national measure or EU proposal, as 
identified by the five assessment criteria, to 
evaluate its proportionality and coherence. 
In setting up this common test of pro-
portionality specific to the area of commer-
Until now, the 
Court's case law 
has not provided 
precise tools for 
assessing the 
proportionality of 
national measures. 
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The analysis of the situation set out in the Green Paper 
makes it clear that much remains to be done before an 
Internal Market exists in commercial communications. 
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cial communications, the Commission 
wants to provide Member States with 
means of determining case by case, and 
with more uniformity, whether the national 
regulation concerned is in proportion to the 
objective sought. The Commission thereby 
hopes that Member States will themselves 
then withdraw some of their regulations if 
they do not comply with this test of propor-
tionality ('national deregulation'). 
If a Member State fails to act, the 
Commission could then start proceedings 
against it. Such a test can also provide ef-
fective help to future plaintiffs, needing to 
assess the national regulations presenting 
problems. 
Implementation of this 'investigation' 
procedure could then lead to the revoking 
of national measures which are shown to 
be incompatible with EU law. Where, on 
the other hand the national measure con-
cerned is found to be proportionate, the 
Commission could then, if need be, pro-
pose a harmonisation text at EU level if no 
appropriate legislation exists in the other 
Member States. 
In addition to this recommended as-
sessment procedure, the Commission 
would like to see better coordination and 
information at European level in the area 
of commercial communication. 
To achieve this, the Commission sug-
gests the setting up of a committee presided 
over by the Commission itself and com-
posed of Member State representatives re-
sponsible for examining problems arising 
in this sector, and especially of ensuring that 
a productive dialogue takes place with and 
between the Member States. This Commit-
tee will help to keep new initiatives in line 
and to limit, where possible, the number of 
cases where action has to be taken because 
of infringement of the Treaty. 
The Commission proposes as well to 
create, within its own administration, a 
central information point responsible for 
answering particular questions about its 
policies regarding commercial communi-
cations. This would also have a coordi-
nating role in this area. 
Thus, the Commission presents in this 
Green Paper both an account of the cur-
rent situation in the area of commercial 
communications as well as a working 
method for tackling the vast amount of 
work to be done to establish an Internal 
Market in commercial communications. 
The Commission now wishes to en-
gage in wide consultation and all inter-
ested parties have until 31 December 
1996 to make known their views on the 
analysis and the proposals put forward in 
this Green Pa per. 
The working method proposed by 
the Commission will perhaps be criticised 
for being somewhat 'technocratic' . As re-
gards the effectiveness of the method, it 
may be questioned whether Member 
States will cooperate actively to ensure its 
implementation. 
However, the professionals (advertis-
ers, agencies and media) should welcome 
the fact that the Commission has decided 
to tackle the advertising sector in thb way. 
The analysis of the situation set out in the 
Green Paper makes it clear that much re-
mains to be done before an Internal Mar-
ket exists in commercial communications. 
It should also be noticed that, on a 
practical level, a conventional approach 
lies behind the words used to describe 
the assessment procedure recommended 
by the Commission (the proportionality 
test). And above all, the professionals 
should be aware of the active role that 
they could be called upon to play in this 
huge task. The Green Paper recalls some 
principles a·nd thereby offers food for 
thc_mght for those who might feel disad-
vantaged in their activities by national 
regulations which breach the principle of 
the free provision of services. Those con-
cerned know that they have an important 
ally in the Commission. 
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The Green Paper -
missed opportunity or 
realistic way forward? 
Jean Bergevin 
Fonctionnaire 
DGXV 
The European Commission 
A t last the debate on the Comm-ission's role in the field of commer-cial communications has earnestly 
begun following the publication of the 
Green Paper. This newsletter can now 
serve as a vehicle to air that debate and 
allow you, the interested party, to take 
your position in full knowledge of the facts 
and the differing views that abound. You 
will find articles both in favour and against 
the initiative in this issue. Our editor has 
welcomed both and we hope that both 
pro and anti-camps will now come for-
ward with their positions following these 
two distinctive lead contributions by 
Clifford Chance and Thomas et Associes. 
Has the Green paper limited 
the Commission's objectives and 
competences? 
These two lead contributions start from 
differing perspectives: The first considers 
the proposals in terms of their usefulness 
in building a new pan-European regula-
framework. The second considers 
ropriateness of the proposals of 
e Green Pa per for meeting the Commis-
sion's objective of safeguarding Internal 
Market law and thus assessing regulatory 
restrictions to cross-border trade. Which 
of these two objectives should the Com-
mission have chosen? 
In point of fact no such choice exists. 
The Treaty limits the competences of the 
Commission. The Green Paper does not 
have an 'abstract agenda' as Clifford 
Chance suggest but rather limits its objec-
tives to those set out in the Treaty, viz. 
that of the Internal Market and the other 
Community objectives which are set out 
in detail in the text. 
This is a fundamentally important 
point for our readers to be aware of. The 
paper by Clifford Chance wrongly sug-
gests that the Commission has the same 
law-making powers as a Member State. It 
suggests that the Commission can impose 
a new European 'benchmark' based on a 
new albeit rather vague, regulatory objec-
tive, viz.: 
'To ensure that regulatory restrictions 
and enforcement practice which impact 
on Commercial Communications are as 
consistent as possible across the Internal 
Market, while respecting protections and 
safeguards which are considered accept-
able and appropriate to achieve defined 
general interest objectives'. 
This is simply incorrect. 
The Commission's competence is de-
fined as safeguarding existing Community 
law as enshrined in the Treaty through 
ensuring that this law is effectively ap-
plied. The Commission is not, as the 
Clifford Chance article suggests, a law-
making or destroying body. It has no 
power and nor does the European Court 
of Justice to assess or judge whether na-
tional regulations are 'justified or dispro-
portionate by reference to stated "general 
interest" objectives'. Instead as the guard-
ian of the European Treaty it must assess 
whether the application of a host coun-
try's measure to a cross-border service al-
ready regulated in the home country is 
proportionate in view of the general inter-
est objective pursued by the host coun-
try's trade restricting measure. 
In other words, it can question, and 
the European Court can judge, whether 
the application of two sets of regulations 
to the same service is justified. Only when 
such restrictions are proportional can a 
harmonisation initiative be justified and 
then such a Commission proposal has to 
be agreed by the Council of Ministers be-
fore it is transposed into national law. In 
any event the Commission cannot assess 
or judge either the quality or the need for 
a national law for its own sake, nor the 
national systems used to enforce that law. 
Given these points, the alternative 
proposals suggested by Mr. Thomas are 
not feasible and indeed would corn-
In any event the 
Commission 
cannot assess or 
judge either the 
quality or the need 
for a national law 
for its own sake, 
nor the national 
systems used to 
enforce that law. 
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interests because it 
is based on what 
they apply on a day 
today basis 
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pletely contravene the principle of 
subsidiarity. In contrast, the contribution 
by Messrs. Pecnard and Delesalle hits the 
nail on the head by focusing on propor-
tionality of the application of host coun-
try rules to services already regulated in 
the home country. 
Are the proposals not 'strong' 
enough to resolve the problem(s)? 
Is the 'technocratic' proportionality 
assessment simply adding to 
bureaucracy? 
Both articles, in different terms, suggest 
that the Commission's proposed propor-
tionality methodology is somewhat tech-
nocratic albeit in different terms with the 
Clifford Chance article being far more 
critical. 
It is somewhat ironic that lawyers ac-
cuse the Commission of being technocratic 
when it sets out the legal principles pro-
vide by the Court of Justice! Four of the 
five criteria are taken straight from case-
law! However, it is more than likely that 
Thomas et Associes' slight concern reflects 
Mr. Thomas's attack on the proposed 
'chain reaction' assessment criterion that 
features in our proposed methodology. As 
an economist and, more significantly, in 
view of the many presentations that I have 
given to various audiences in recent 
weeks, one can only smile when one sees 
the reaction to the market assessment by 
professional lawyers. 
To quote Mr. Thomas (in his full text) 
on the criterion and the analytical work 
that it relies upon 'it is doubtful whether 
the "chain reaction" analysis (i.e. analysis 
of the separate effects on users, suppliers 
and carriers) would be realistic, achiev-
able or helpful'. And 'The accompanying 
Working Document (on which the pro-
posals are based) contains a lengthy, con-
voluted and largely irrelevant economic 
analysis. Yet there is no more than a gen-
eral categorised (and questionable) tabu-
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lation of different national measures. 
There is no detailed description or analy-
sis of the detailed provisions which un-
derlie the very broad summaries set out in 
the Regulatory Tables'. 
In addition, Mr. Thomas suggests that 
the economic analysis is flawed due to 
dubious data. These criticisms are worthy 
of three simple responses. 
First, to appreciate the proportionality 
of a measure (a pp lied to an incoming 
service) which seeks to meet its policy 
objective by influencing market behav-
iour, it is difficult to understand why a 
methodology seeking to structurally 
present how that same market operates 
would not be 'realistic, achievable or 
helpful'. We believe it is essential and so 
do many early respondents. 
The working document sets out the 
Commission's views on how this market 
operates based on relevant economic and 
business literature. The descriptive statis-
tics provided are there to explain the eco-
nomic significance of the sector but t 
do not relate to the structural an 
the linkages between the various p _ ~~ 
Their apparent inaccuracy (which rE:':0,; '-I 
the appalling data shortages in this , 
do not reflect on the structural anal 
Secondly the regulatory tables a -, as 
mentioned in the Green Paper, a sum-
mary of two years work by Professor 
Schricker of the Max Planck Institute. 
They are based on 15 country reports, a 
comparative summary of which is avail-
able from the Commission and which nu-
merous law firms have asked for. 
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that, 
contrary to the views of the lawyers, the 
chain reaction is considered both 'achiev-
able and helpful' by business interests 
because it is based on what they apply on 
a day to day basis i.e. branding strategies 
associated with their relevant products 
and services. Likewise, the chain reaction 
allows the Commission to account for all 
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the influences exerted on final consumers 
and not rely on a simplistic view that ad-
vertising is somehow isolated from the 
rest of the marketing-mix, viz. price, _dis-
tribution and product/ service design strat-
egies. Thus a restriction on advertising is 
shown to lead to business reactions that 
will have other effects on consumers. In 
other words, the 'chain reaction' analysis 
allows for more effective account to be 
taken of the true effect on consumers of 
restrictions on cross-border services . It 
may be complicated for lawyers but it is 
far from unrealistic to both businesses 
and consumers. 
In summary, it is precisely because 
the Commission recognised that the pro-
portionality assessment methodology fol-
lowing the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice was not easy to apply that 
it proposed the 'chain reaction'. This, we 
believe facilitates and will improve this 
assessment which is at the foundation of 
ar:y infringement decision or harmonisa-
tion proposal in this field. 
Is the Committee bound to failure? 
The Clifford Chance article suggests that 
the closed nature of the committee '( where 
national interests will be promoted, but 
where many relevant interests will be ex-
cluded) can only frustrate efforts to make 
any real progress'. 
Three points need to be stressed here . 
Through the proposed network which 
seeks to ensure transparency through en-
suring that information on policy devel-
opments are sent to as many interested 
parties as possible, the Committee's 
agenda as well as findings will be made 
more public than if the Committee sat in 
a public hearing format. 
Furthermore, the proposed approach 
is easier in organisational terms to arrange 
and should allow for more meetings and 
thus progress. Finally, since it is proposed 
that issues will be considered on the ba-
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sis of the common proportionality assess-
ment methodology, the scope for promo-
tion of national interests is likely to be far 
less than is the case when proposals are 
negotiated in Council of Ministers meet-
ings without any pre-agreed framework. 
Priorities as to which problems should be 
addressed will be set according to the views 
given in responses to the Green Paper 
Of course, all this will depend on the 
degree to which interested parties get in-
volved in the 'network' . The success of this 
newsletter which represents the initiating 
element of this network suggests that inter-
ested parties are prepared to take on this 
long but necessary task. As the article of 
Messrs. Pecnard and Delesalle suggests, 
the Commission is prepared to be an ally 
to interested parties but without them sup-
porting this approach it will be doomed to 
failure. 
Did we start at the wrong-end? 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commis-
sion neither seeks to judge national laws, 
(it can only question the application of 
national laws to services and goods which 
are already regulated in another Member 
State) nor has the powers to establish new 
policy objectives not found in the Treaty, 
it could of course have decided to simply 
assume that all the identified barriers were 
justified (i.e. proportional) and thus gone 
ahead and harmonised those laws which 
it thought were the most problematic. In-
stead of choosing this 'top-down ap-
proach' suggested by Clifford Chance, it 
has selected the 'bottom-up approach' . 
As a consequence of that choice: 
1) Priorities as to which problems should 
be addressed will be set according to the 
views of interested parties as given in 
their responses to the Green Paper. 
2) A thorough examination of whether 
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these identified trade restrictions are pro-
portional will be undertaken with full 
consultation of the Member States and in-
terested parties before harmonisation is 
considered. 
3) Only those areas where restrictions are 
agreed to be proportional will be subject 
to proposals for harmonisation. 
What the Internal Market principles can do is 
question the application of different restrictions 
but they certainly cannot and should not 
question the regulatory systems of Member 
States. This is truly an issue of subsidiarity. 
We believe that this approach will 
allow for an effective cross-border regula-
tory framework for commercial communi-
cations in the Community to be established 
rapidly. We also believe it is likely to be 
more successful than a confrontational and 
broad harmonisation initiative that is likely 
to require many years of negotiation and 
risks being too broad and thus less than ef-
fective for both consumers and businesses. 
Should we not rely on 
self-regulation? 
The problems we are faced with are 
where Member States refuse to allow the 
free circulation of already regulated serv-
ices emanating from other Member States 
into their territories. Effective national 
self-regulatory codes applied in the same 
manner give rise to exactly the same 
problem. Thus, self-regulation should be 
recognised as part of the existing prob-
lem. 
However, it can therefore also provide 
part of the solution. In those Member 
States where an effective self-regulatory 
system complements (or indeed com-
pletes) underlying regulatory measures, 
the organisations applying these codes, 
should, as we are asking the Member 
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States, consider whether they could live 
with mutual recognition. If they cannot 
'trust' each others codes sufficiently to do 
this then they should be negotiating 
through the EASA as to which applications 
of codes to cross-border services are not 
proportional and thus where modifications 
or harmonisation of codes is required. 
That is the challenge that self-regulatory 
bodies face. 
As to the notion that self-regulation 
should in some manner 'substitute' law, 
this again reflects a 'top-down' approach 
imposing a system that the regulatory cul-
ture and tradition of other Member States 
have not opted for. Whereas it is recog-
nised that self-regulation can be a very 
useful complement and facilitate the appli-
cation of framework law, one should nev-
ertheless recognise that national regulatory 
systems and their differing levels of reli-
ance on self-regulation are embedded in 
the culture and history of a Member State. -
What the Internal Market principles can do 
is question the application of different re-
strictions but they certainly cannot and 
should not question the regulatory systems 
of Member States. This is truly an issue of 
subsidiarity. 
We hope that this article will further 
incite you to send the Commission your 
position in this key debate . Given the fact 
that we are still receiving requests for the 
Green Paper and that the European Par-
liament is only beginning to prepare its 
opinion on the Green Paper we have de-
cided to extend our deadline for re-
sponses to the end March. 
If you want to air your views and sup-
port or criticise the Commission's propos-
als in public then do not hesitate to send 
your positions to our editor. He tells me 
it all helps readership and the more of 
you that join this policy network we are 
constructing the better for all! 
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Advertising and the 
European Union 
Ken Collins MEP, 
Chairman, 
European Parliament's Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health 
and Consumer Protection 
The Treaty of Rome which was adopted in 1957, introduced the concept of the free movement of 
goods, services, persons and capital. 
However, progress towards this goal was 
fraught with difficulty and, as a conse-
quence, rather slow. Indeed, it gradually 
became apparent that without the dem-
onstration of a huge show of political 
will, the idea of free movement was un-
likely to become a reality. 
In 1985 therefore the Commission 
published a White Paper called 'Complet-
ing the Internal Market' which specified 
some 300 measures which the report 's 
author, European Commissioner, Lord 
Cockfield, believed would have to be in-
troduced before the Internal Market could 
be considered complete. The target date 
for its completion was 1992. 
However, despite the adoption of an 
impressive number of measures from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s, the Internal 
Market is still far from complete. The case 
of commercial communications in general 
and advertising in particular is a case in 
point. The Community has never at-
tempted to produce any kind of overall 
framework in which to place the legisla-
tion in this field although rules are in place 
relating to a series of specific types of ad-
vertising and specific product categories. 
As the Green Paper points out, there is 
already legislation relating to misleading 
advertising, foodstuffs, financial services, 
medicinal products, data protection and 
television broadcasts. In addition, legisla-
tion on comparative advertising is under 
discussion. It would be far more sensible 
if these various pieces of legislation were 
grouped into an overall policy framework 
possibly reinforced by some particular 
rules for certain products. 
In this article, I want to focus on why 
the EU plays a central role in devising a 
policy for commercial communications. I 
then want to examine in greater detail 
what the European Parliament's role in all 
of this will be, before raising a number of 
preliminary questions relating to the 
green pa per itself. 
The EU's added-value 
At a glance it may be assumed that linguis-
tic and cultural barriers largely prevent, for 
example, cross-border advertising, direct 
mail or sales promotions. Yet Commission 
surveys demonstrate that there is cross-
border advertising, there are pan-
European agencies and multinational com-
panies selling European branded products 
(see previous editions of Commercial 
Communications for detailed survey 
analysis). 
The fact that commercial communica-
tion is a cross-border activity is one rea-
son why regulation at EU rather than 
national level is desirable. The growth of 
new technology and methods of commu-
nication is likely to accentuate the cross-
border trend still further. Furthermore, 
since the purpose of commercial commu-
nication is primarily to promote the sale 
of goods, it is clearly an area which falls 
under internal market rules. Third, from 
the point of view of consumer protection, 
there is little point encouraging consum-
ers to buy goods in a country other than 
the one in which they are resident if their 
subsequent rights to guarantees and jus-
tice are undermined as a result. This 
means that EU rather than national rules 
will be more effective. 
Any future legislation in this area is 
likely to fall under Internal Market rules 
which means that policy will be brought 
forward under Article 1 OOa of the Treaty 
on European Union. This in turn, has im-
plications for how advertisers and users 
should attempt to influence the debate 
because 100a legislation is agreed by 
codecision-making. 
This is not the place to launch into a 
detailed explanation of the institutional 
Furthermore, 
since the purpose 
of commercial 
communication is 
primarily to 
promote the sale 
of goods, it is 
clearly an area 
which falls under 
internal market 
rules 
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theory of EU decision-making. Suffice it 
to say that codecision-making involves 
the Council of Ministers and the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) taking a joint deci-
sion on draft legislation and if no final 
agreement can be reached, it is the EP 
rather than the Council which has the 
power of veto. 
This is significant for two reasons. It 
means that the debate will be accessible 
since it will take place largely in the open 
EP at European level. As representatives 
of industries and consumers alike, MEPs 
have a particular responsibility to ensure 
that all points of view are aired and that 
the final outcome is clear, offering ad-
equate consumer protection without be-
ing too burdensome for industry. 
However, the EP is more than a de-
bating society where all the different 
points of view can be raised and then 
filed away neatly in the archives. The EP 
also bears a legislative responsibility and 
it is particularly appropriate therefore for 
MEPs to be involved at an early stage in 
the debate. Of course, it is impossible for 
any one MEP or indeed the EP as a whole 
to form a firm view until legislative pro-
posals arising from this communication 
have been transmitted officially to the EP. 
That said, even at this stage a number of 
preliminary points may be raised in con-
nection with the communication. 
In the main these concern firstly, the 
composition of the proposed consultative 
committee and second, the question of 
the relationship between suppliers of 
commercial communications and their cli-
ents. 
As far as the composition of the Com-
mittee is concerned, it is vital that a suffi-
ciently wide group of interests participate 
so that a representative view of policy can 
be formulated. It is all too easy for these 
types of committee to be dominated by 
one particular view. In addition, without 
a conscious effort to publicise the work of 
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the Committee it is a possibility that the 
aim of the Commission to ensure that its 
approach is transparent will amount to 
very little. 
As for the relationship between pub-
lic relations companies and their clients, 
this should be explicitly defined. For ex-
ample, ever since the 1979 direct elec-
tions to the EP, the relationship between 
some public relations firms and their to-
bacco company clients has been the sub-
ject of intense debate. The question of 
tobacco advertising has nothing to do 
with freedom of speech or the right to 
trade freely in a free market. It is prima-
rily a public health issue and as new 
forms of commercial communication be-
come available it is more, not less impor-
tant to examine this relationship between 
client and agency. This is all the more 
important since some agencies specifi-
cally do not work with tobacco compa-
nies, thus reinforcing the argument that 
tobacco is not a product like any other. 
As long ago as 1991, I and other 
MEPs, realising the potential impact of 
unregulated advertising on consumer 
protection called on the Commission to 
produce a green paper on advertising. 
This was followed in 1992 by a public 
hearing in the EP's Committee on the En-
vironment, Public Health and Consumer 
Protection on 'Consumers, Advertising 
and the Internal Market'. Now, in 1996, 
the Commission has finally published a 
Green Paper on commercial communica-
tions. This is of course, wider in scope 
than advertising alone. It also covers di-
rect marketing, sponsorship, sales promo-
tion and public relations promoting 
products and services. The research 
which was conducted prior to the public 
of the Green Paper demonstrates a clear 
need for EU-wide action. Let us hope that 
it is not another five years before this ac-
tion sees the light of day. 
